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Introduction
Literature, Law, and Desire
To the extent that law itself is a narrative, it cannot only be the accumulated
record of issues resolved through application of law to facts by a neutral deci-
sion maker. By recognizing the tinted narrative lens, we can understand how
law reinforces the views of the powerful through the continual retelling of
stories from the dominant perspective.1
This book emerges out of the recognition that women’s literature and
literature about women seem insistently to revisit questions of the law,
the parameters of the court, and the regulation of desire. It is not
based on whether the representations of the law in literature are accu-
rate or truthful (though there are instances in which I will be compar-
ing the real life basis of the texts with their fictional, dramatic, or
filmic counterparts), but it is rather an exploration of what is still a rel-
atively underexplored aspect of the law and literature field(s): women
and the law in contemporary literature and culture.
My interest in the field is as a literature specialist and a feminist,
and I am particularly concerned with how women as subjects of
courtroom dialogue and debate become translated into objects on
display and with the ways in which their voices become contained or
controlled by narratives to which they have only limited access. Car-
olyn Heilbrun and Judith Resnik, pioneers in the area of feminist law
and literature, argue that the feminist branch of the field is particular-
ly interested in women’s stories: how they are told, what they might
reveal or conversely conceal, and how shared or familiar tales inter-
sect (in this, they have much in common with Critical Legal Schol-
ars). Disappointed that much of this sharing of stories involves a
1
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recitation of women’s injuries and silences, they argue that feminist
studies should instead explore women’s “right to anger, their use of
powerl.l.l.l[and] their noncomplicity in the role of sex object.”2 This
is a utopic desire. Indeed, one need only read the latest newspapers to
discover that although one may prefer to read of women’s power and
success in the courtroom, one is confronted—as we shall see—with
images of the mad, the bad, and the powerless instead.
That the law comes first in the law and literature movement is
clear from a quick examination of much of the movement’s critical
work, and it is within this context that my introduction proceeds. It
has become almost compulsory for law and literature books to start by
exploring the rich, and sometimes beleaguered, history of the law and
literature movement (such as it is), and so this book is no exception.
The idea of a movement calling itself “law and literature” can be
traced back to the early part of the twentieth century in an oft-quoted
article by Benjamin Cardozo entitled “Law and Literature” (1925).
The next significant text in the field was James Boyd White’s The
Legal Imagination (1973), which is most often seen as having kick-
started the movement in its current formulation(s). Since then, the
field has been divided into a variety of subsets, the most common of
which are the “law as literature” and “law in literature” constructions.
Richard Weisberg credits this division to Ephraim London, a New
York lawyer.3 Law as literature is primarily concerned with the literary
quality of the law, thus reading legal texts as literary texts, whereas law
in literature focuses on how the law is depicted in literature itself, and
this latter subfield is the main focus of this text.
More recently, Tony Sharpe has suggested two further categories:
“literature as law” (“a competitive emulation of law by literature”) and
“literature in law” (the “comparison within a literary text, between
legal methodology and its own ways of working”).4 Sharpe’s reformu-
lation of the law and literature project is not meant to privilege litera-
ture, but to “consider some of the ways in which law has been misun-
derstood or misrepresented in literature.”5 In this formulation, Sharpe
follows in the footsteps of a high-profile critic of the law and literature
movement: Richard Posner. Posner argues that “[t]here are better
places to learn about law than novels—except perhaps to learn how
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laymen react to law and lawyers.”6 Posner’s stance is particularly con-
frontational, but other critics welcome the way that law and literature
find spaces in common. As Dieter Paul Polloczek argues, this might
be particularly useful for liberal humanists or feminist critics who
“continue to describe beneficial interactions, both historical and spec-
ulative, between judicial authority and literature, seeing both as per-
formances of a communal rhetoric open to many voices, and in this
sense capable of moral progress.”7 While this stance is perhaps ideal-
istic—Richard Weisberg would characterize it as “sentimentalist”8—
it does serve to highlight one way in which law and literature might
be fruitfully joined with feminism, a possibility I explore in the pages
and chapters to come.
A connection between literature and the law is certainly not new,
as critics such as Robert Ferguson and Theodore Ziolkowski point
out. Indeed, Ferguson outlines the historical trajectory of the law and
letters interface. Arguing that lawyers “dominated” early American lit-
erary circles, Ferguson sets out the ways in which this was the case:
Half of the important critics of the day trained for law, and attorneys con-
trolled many of the important journals. Belles lettres societies furnished the
major basis of cultural concern for post-Revolutionary America; they
depended heavily on the legal profession for their memberships. Lawyers
also wrote many of the country’s first important novels, plays, and poems. No
other vocational group, not even the ministry, matched their contribution.9
Yet Theodore Ziolkowski argues that the interdisciplinary practice of
law and literature is “too fascinating and important to be conceded to
the lawyers. Issues of law are so central to human society that they
dominate many of the landmark works of Western literature and
thereby have a claim on the attention of all educated people.”10 As a
result, he coins his own interdisciplinary space as “literature and law”
in a reversal of the usual order.11 Indeed, of all designations, this
might fit my own stance most clearly. It is certainly the case that liter-
ary critics have made important headway into the movement over the
last few years, not least because their skills of narrative analysis are
particularly well suited to the field. The journal New Formations ded-
icated an entire special volume, Legal Fictions, to the project in 1997.
It is in focusing on narrative itself—the organization of story—that
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practitioners of law and literature have most in common. However, as
Polloczek argues, the field continues to lack “interdisciplinary con-
sensus” on “whether it is the approximation or the distance between
law and literature that ought to be emphasized.”12 In a separate but
related argument, Willem J. Witteveen suggests that the present quest
to expand the law and literature canon could lead to a fragmentation
of a developing discipline (though, paradoxically, he also argues that
the field should embrace additional kinds of texts, moving away from
the standard focus on the novel).13
Jane Baron contends that the “multiplicity of approaches and con-
cerns that leads some to see literature as a source of nearly endless
possibilities may lead sceptics to dismiss law and literature as an emp-
ty vessel, a phrase devoid of content.”14 Baron argues that law and lit-
erature proponents (in her terminology, “law-and-lits”) fall into three
basic camps: humanist law-and-lits, who think literature is good for
lawyers; hermeneutic law-and-lits, who want to focus on literary theo-
ry and “interpretive methodologies borrowed from literary studies”;
and narrative law-and-lits, who are interested in storytelling.15 There is
certainly a well-developed strand of law and literature research which
maintains that literature offers the lawyer an opportunity to become
somehow better at his or her job, or that the teaching of literature is
more than just an easy option for law students tired of the “harder”
material.16 In relation to the second group, individuals like Sanford
Levinson are frequently cited,17 and as an example of the last group,
David R. Papke presents a range of legal storytelling in his edited col-
lection Narrative and Legal Discourse. Well-known legal storytellers
include Richard Delgado and Jerome Culp, among others.18 Baron
finds fault with each of these approaches and also contends that
“legal scholars seemed to have turned to literary studies just when
there was the least consensus within the latter field about how to
read.”19 She further argues that the “certainty with which legal schol-
ars assert what are actually quite contestable readings is, thus, under-
standable, but still incongruous.”20
One of the perennial problems of interdisciplinary study is that it is
perplexing to see the use that nonspecialists make of your own special-
ism and to see or try to understand their understanding of the critical
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debates in the subject that you more fully “own.” Indeed, to my eyes, a
lot of the law and literature movement seriously misreads the nature
of literary studies. A surprising emphasis is placed on either authorial
intentionality or canonicity, with no or little awareness of how these
ideas have been successfully challenged in literary studies. That judges
must decide between competing interpretations and within a frame-
work of historical narratives perhaps ensures this focus. At the same
time, though, it remains somewhat surprising to see how literature is
being referenced in texts edited in the late 1990s and beyond. Many
law and literature texts resolutely refer to “the reader” as a generic
“he,” an anachronism that has been successfully rooted out of most lit-
erary studies.
In addition, much of the law and literature field concentrates its
debates on the so-called great works of literature: thus, contemporary
texts, as well as texts by women, working-class writers, or ethnic mi-
nority writers, are only haphazardly addressed in textbooks aimed at a
general law and literature audience. In the appendix to their 1991 arti-
cle “Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?”
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic note the numeric discrepancy
between white men and white women considered part of the law and
literature canon and argue that only two ethnic minority men figure,
and no women.21 Although clearly such stark divisions have altered,
the case for inclusion has by no means been won. Michele G. Fal-
kow, for example, in an article about great works, acknowledged that
she selected her texts by canvassing the syllabuses of “top” colleges,
thus inadvertently invoking elitist measures twice; admittedly, she
acknowledges Toni Morrison’s Beloved as a canonical text, but her
methods—apparently straightforward to her—reveal the same biases
against women writers and writers of ethnic minorities in their com-
fortable retention of the status quo.22 In another example, a new
coursebook, Law and Popular Culture, published in 2004, offered
only a handful of pages on gender and feminism and even fewer
pages on ethnicity, while purporting to offer a comprehensive account
of how the law works in popular film. As a result, the law continues to
be seen as a white male enterprise, with a few “others” mentioned as
appropriate.23 Feminist law and literature textbooks have rectified
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some of these omissions, though they also often confine themselves to
better-known works of literature. Darwinian notions of “survival of the
fittest” appear to take the place of any serious analysis of why some
works of literature are or remain marketable, while others, popular at
the time of their appearance, disappear.
Ronald Dworkin, for example, puts forward an “aesthetic hypoth-
esis” that suggests that critics are principally interested in offering an
interpretation which shows the text in the best light.24 Dworkin also
values the literary canon, as well as “coherence or integrity in art.” He
argues that “[a]n interpretation cannot make a work of art more dis-
tinguished if it makes a large part of the text irrelevant, or much of
the incident accidental,”25 and yet, few literary critics would argue
that their primary role is that of enhancing a work of art (though,
admittedly, many feminist critics such as myself wish to rescue texts
that have been critically overlooked, often because of their contesta-
tory politics). Even fewer would suggest that a literary text has to be
taken in its entirety in order to be valuable; in relation to Angela
Carter’s fantastical narrative Nights at the Circus, for example (ana-
lyzed in chapter 1), I refer to only one small section: the prison scene
that itself does seem almost incidental to the wider narrative, but that
offers a telling exploration of the panopticon, an important image or
structure in women’s literature.
In the introduction to The Mirror of Justice: Literary Reflections of
Legal Crises, Ziolkowski states that he does not wish to “engage in the
polemics that enliven many of the contributions to Law and Litera-
ture,”26 and despite my concerns noted above, this is a feeling I share.
Indeed, a surprising number of law and literature articles appear to
cite disputes and critical contests with other critics—which may be a
measure of their lawyerly nature. Examples of such critical disagree-
ments abound, but the most commonly cited ones include Richard
Posner on Richard Weisberg; Stanley Fish, Robin West, and Weisberg
on Posner; and Weisberg on “feminists” and “postmodernists.” Never-
theless, it is important to recognize that law and literature experts do
not speak with one voice, and that my own voice is at odds with some
of the leaders in the field, namely Weisberg and Posner (who, as I
note above, are themselves at odds with each other). In order to set
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out my critical stall (as it were), it will then be necessary for me to
explore how these critics address the law and literature interface and
to look at some of the issues that this interdiscipline faces and reacts
to and against (including feminism and the politics of storytelling),
before concluding with a case study of Morley Callaghan’s short sto-
ry, “A Wedding-Dress,” which has also been ably explored by the law
and literature critic Gary Boire.
In the Name of the Father:
Weisberg and Posner on the Canon
Resistance to or ignorance of feminist concerns is evident in
much law and literature scholarship, particularly from scholars who
see either canonicity or intentionality as the mainstays of the field.
Out of the twenty-five texts that Barry R. Schaller discussed at length
and accorded abbreviated titles in A Vision of American Law, only
one, Joyce Carol Oates’s them, was by a woman. Schaller argues that
he “began to search for meanings that would bring coherence and
clarity to a story of law and culture.”27 Clearly, “clarity” and coher-
ence are possible only if one does not acknowledge the female. Sch-
aller is certainly not the only law and literature critic to ignore or
sideline the female; it is an unfortunate element of the field, particu-
larly in relation to two scholars, Weisberg and Posner, who stand out
both for their impact on law and literature and for their resistance to
claims from outsider voices.
Richard Weisberg is one of the leading proponents of law and lit-
erature (in old critical terms, a founding father), and I admire Weis-
berg’s commitment to the field, if not his convictions. He is, for exam-
ple, an editor of one of only two law and literature journals, launched
as Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature but now simply entitled
Law and Literature. He is also the author of many articles in the field,
frequently a guest speaker at law and literature conferences (indeed,
he presented a keynote address at the Law and Literature conference
in Nice in 2001 that inaugurated my own participation in the field),
and has written two major texts: The Failure of the Word: The Lawyer
as Protagonist in Modern Fiction (Yale University Press, 1984) and
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Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature (Columbia, 1992).
It is the latter text which interests me here.
Weisberg is a fan of the “Great Books” tradition and justifies his
exclusive focus on the canon as a pedagogical one: it is justified in
the sense that working on major texts is the first step toward incorpo-
rating difference and opening up the canon for new voices. However,
as Gaurav Desai, Felipe Smith, and Supriya Nair argue, “judging by
his later work, it does not seem that Weisberg thinks that the time is
right even now to fully integrate any of these ‘lesser-known voices.’” 28
Moreover, in relation to all outsider voices but especially in relation to
the voices of ethnic minority writers, they argue that “most of the work
in this area currently speaks more to the struggle to be heard rather
than to resounding success.”29
In this exploration of poetic ethics, Weisberg sticks primarily to
“establishment male authors” but argues that this “hardly denotes
acceptance of the traditional canon when the male narrative enter-
prise itself is being criticized for its violence and its twisting of the
truth.”30 This seems a curious argument, and Weisberg’s reluctance to
engage with outsider narratives is disappointing. He argues that “even
when treating male-authored texts, some of which have no female
characters, the Law and Literature syllabus still raises many issues of
concern to feminists.”31 This is no doubt true, but it does not excuse
the lack of representation he promotes. As Desai, Smith, and Nair ar-
gue, “the ideal scenario is one in which is there is a balance between
a number of critical approaches and a diverse range of texts. Readings
of the traditional canon that approach it from feminist or race-con-
scious perspectives are, of course, a very important aspect of literary
scholarship. But they cannot be held to be sufficient.”32
Throughout, Weisberg references “law” rather than “the law,” as if
law is a person whose name can be called. The name is, however, al-
ways the name of the father. In the preface to Poethics, Weisberg vil-
ifies his fellow law and literature critics Posner and James Boyd
White, but also lists, on his dedication page, ten “lifelong friends,” all
male. Against this list, in the edition shelved at the University of
Toronto’s Robarts Library, a (presumably) female reader has scrawled,
“Watch out for girl germs.”33 Indeed, this delightfully subversive com-
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ment resonates almost as much as Weisberg’s own words, and offers a
sort of (dis)authorizing gloss that disables the premises on which it is
formed.
When answering the criticism that law and literature has failed to
embrace or even engage with contemporary literary theory, Weisberg
disingenuously argues that leveling this criticism is much like criticiz-
ing Freud for not taking on Marx. Further, he argues, “it cannot fair-
ly be resented of one progressive line of thinking that it pays scant
attention to other contemporaneous innovators.”34 Such an argument
is a critical sleight of hand, for the movement itself, in its very name,
embraces literature. To then deny the last twenty years of literary the-
ory in this “new” discipline is not only deceitful but regressive.
In an article published in 1999, Weisberg reiterates many of his
previous points, but goes even further in his antipathy toward femi-
nists and postmodernists. He suggests that “for twenty or twenty-five
years, lawyers interested in stories have sustained the unfashionable
position—anathema even or especially to literary theorists—that the
single text or collection of texts both exists and can be referenced to
the real world.”35 This stubborn refusal to see that challenging the
canon does not amount to challenging the existence of texts per se is
disingenuous again. Moreover, as has been noted above, many
branches of feminist criticism hold fast to a notion of correspondence
between the literary and real worlds (if not, it has to be stressed, to a
naïve notion of transparency).
Weisberg’s offhand remarks about feminists need no further explo-
ration here: but his is one voice that is implicitly contested in the writ-
ing of this book, which focuses on the textual representation of
women’s voices. I offer analysis of texts by both men and women
(refusing the gender separatism practiced elsewhere in the recogni-
tion that separate is never equal). It is true that the great preponder-
ance of my analysis focuses on women’s literature, but this is because
more women than men have been proactively feminist. Some of the
texts I analyze are well known (indeed, almost “canonical”), and oth-
ers are more recent and less often critiqued. I believe (to misquote
Weisberg’s stance) that even when treating female-authored texts,
some of which focus only fleetingly on male characters, the law and
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literature movement still raises many issues of concern to all law and
literature experts, feminists and nonfeminists alike. In this respect, I
follow Weisberg’s call to “make the reader uneasy about the legal
assumptions that preceded the understanding of the story,”36 though
surely to different ends. As Jacqueline St. Joan remarks, “in interpret-
ing testimony, weighing evidence, and assessing credibility, judges are
most likely to rely on the dominant perspective not only because it is
the most familiar, but also because legal precedent usually is ground-
ed in that point of view.”37 My text is one that offers a chance to look
from a different point of view: one that highlights and foregrounds
women’s myriad and differently experienced encounters with the law.
In the preface to his revised edition of Law and Literature (1998),
Richard Posner comments that American law has “troubled encoun-
ters” with women and those whom he terms “blacks.”38 If American
law cannot successfully or appropriately deal with half the population
(taking, in this instance, the “plight” of women alone), then surely
this says something about the way in which the law works (or doesn’t
work). The fact that this statement can be made at all reveals the bat-
tle which faces the feminist and/or race-conscious critic of legal and
literary studies. Posner is, by all accounts, the most frequently cited
law and literature critic, an ironic fact given his stiff (and I use the
term advisedly) criticism of the project. He characterizes the move-
ment as “full of false starts, tendentious interpretations, shallow po-
lemics, glib generalizations, and superficial insights.”39 In this, of
course, it has much in common with any discipline, and this is thus
no real criticism at all. Posner suggests that it is acceptable to take dif-
ferent critical stances toward each half of this “and” subject: “Law is a
system of social control as well as a body of texts, and its operation is
illuminated by the social sciences and judged by ethical criteria. Lit-
erature is an art, and the best methods for interpreting and evaluating
it are aesthetic. There is no inconsistency between being a formalist
in literature and an antiformalist, a pragmatist, in law—which hap-
pens to be my position.”40 There may well be no inconsistency here,
but again, we find that the emphasis on aesthetics leaves little room
for other forms of critical intervention into the arts. Moreover, Pos-
ner, like Weisberg, is critical of a variety of well-established schools of
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critical thought. He indiscriminately lumps together critics whom he
sees as having a “radical bent” under the term “postmodernists”; this
grouping includes critics employing “neo-Marxism, radical feminism,
critical theory and poststructuralism,”41 a combination that would sur-
prise, if not in some instances dismay, many of the diverse scholars
who take up these various positions.
Posner, to give him credit, does acknowledge that in relation to the
canon, the Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest may have more
to do with chance and circumstance than with “good literature,” but
this is a minor concession.42 He is, moreover, suspicious of popular
culture.
It is, however, in his suspicion of feminism that we most clearly
part ways. Consider the following quotation: “Feminist literary critics
are trying to boost the reputation of a number of women writers, some
hitherto unknown, but it is too early to say whether their efforts will
succeed.”43 When he argues that feminists are “trying to boost” wo-
men’s literary reputations, he clearly means they are not quite achiev-
ing it. When he cites “a number of women writers” but offers no
names, he is clearly dismissive of the project, and when he assigns to
an imaginary future the end results of such efforts, he denies the very
real progress made by feminists in re-visioning the canon and/or dis-
mantling the concept altogether.
This is not to say that Posner is all wrong; occasionally he offers
useful gems, and his writing has a clarity that many critics would do
well to emulate. But his story of the law is not my story; it is not, on
the whole, the story of contemporary texts or writing about and by
women, and it is necessary to break free from the rather limited
canon of texts that characterize early (and some later) versions of the
law and literature movement. Critical studies such as those undertak-
en by Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette prove that the preponderance of
texts analyzed in law and literature courses are written by white men
of European descent;44 even here, though, such evidence is read in
opposing ways, reminding us of Stanley Fish’s argument that it is
“entirely possible that the parties to our imagined dispute might find
themselves pointing to the same ‘stretch of language’ (no longer the
same, since each would be characterizing it differently) and claiming
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it as a ‘fact’ in support of opposing interpretations.”45 In this instance,
we have Weisberg pointing to Gemmette’s second study as evidence
of the health of law and literature as a movement, whereas Judith
Resnik sees in this study the critical preponderance of canonicity.46
Law and literature critics must continue to challenge their own
critical enterprise and continue to find new ways to engage with texts
from outside the canon: texts by African Americans, by women of all
ethnicities, and by writers from the late twentieth century and be-
yond. The powerful work of feminist critics such as Judith Resnik, the
late Carolyn Heilbrun, Robin West, Martha Albertson Fineman,
Maria Aristodemou, and Patricia Williams, to name but a few, is help-
ing to shape feminist law and literature, and it is to the questions and
debates of this field that I now turn.
Gender: What Difference Does it Make?
Feminist law and literature is a field that, in some ways, replicates
issues that have been prominent in feminist literary studies for some
time: voice versus silence, the performance and punishment of femi-
ninity, the right to anger, and the consequences of stepping outside of
prescribed gender roles. Feminist law and literature critics take a vari-
ety of stances in relation to this hyphenated discipline, from liberal-
humanist calls for equality under the law, to recognitions that equali-
ty may not, in fact, be the solution at all. Michael Thomson argues
that “there has been minimal feminist engagement with this field of
scholarship. Indeed, the interaction between feminism and law and
literature has been, at best, hesitant, tentative.”47 Such a criticism is
both unfounded and quite clearly gendered. Here, feminists them-
selves are rendered unsure, quiet, small: characteristics frequently
associated with women for the purposes, overt or concealed, of dis-
abling their authority. Yet as authors and authorities, women have
been very vocal about the challenges facing law and literature, as well
as their disappointment that changes are not occurring fast enough.
Marie Ashe, Jane Baron, Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, and Carol
Sanger are but a few of the prolific women writing on a range of law
and literature topics; as Sanger remarks, in relation to the short story
“A Jury of Her Peers” but with equal applicability to the entire law
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and literature enterprise, “what we are able to see is often not a mat-
ter of what is before us, but of the particular qualities of the lens we
choose for the examination.”48
In her essay “Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast,”
Robin West boldly announces: “I use the word ‘woman’ to include
men as well as women, ‘she’ to include the male pronoun, and ‘wom-
ankind’ to include mankind.”49 Thus for West, the literary woman is a
figure who encompasses both men and women in a reversal of the usu-
al gendering of the anonymous. Such a bold critical stance moves
beyond the token gesture of referring to the reader as “she” throughout
an article, and by this I don’t mean to undervalue the importance of
this tactic for raising awareness. What I am suggesting is that West’s ter-
minology requires readers to engage in a radical rethink; by using the
literary woman trope insistently, West constantly draws attention to
gender, even as she is, apparently, erasing it. This erasure of gender is
thus fundamentally different from the erasure of gender that the figure
of blind justice suggests; in the courtroom, to ignore gender (as to
ignore ethnicity, sexual preference, class, and other identity markers) is
sometimes to cause harm. As Catherine MacKinnon powerfully argues,
Inequality is treating someone differently if one is the same, the same if one
is different. Unquestioned is how difference is socially created or defined,
who sets the point of reference for sameness, or the comparative empirical
approach itself. Why should anyone have to be like white men to get what
they have, given that white men do not have to be like anyone except each
other to have it? Since men have defined women as different to the extent
they are female, can women be entitled to equal treatment only to the extent
they are not women?50
This book comes of a struggle to adapt to and understand a post-
egalitarian feminist stance. My liberal Anglo-American feminism—a
feminism that seeks equal treatment under law and in society, and
reevaluates female contributions to the arts and science—has been
challenged on a number of fronts during the course of my research:
from revisionist feminists who dismiss the feminism of the 1970s and
1980s that shaped my intellectual heritage as somehow “essentialist”;
from feminists who have almost insistently picked at the evidence of
their own blindness, particularly around ethnicity and race conscious-
ness (but, as with scabs, such picking might simply create scars rather
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than heal differences); and from postegalitarian feminists who suggest
that women are indeed different—not only from each other but, more
importantly, from men—and thus need a different legal system, too.
Noting that the law is “a system of rules and norms, many of which
are designed to have universal application,” Martha Fineman argues
that what is in fact needed is a nonuniversal application.51 Specifically,
she argues that “[n]eutral treatment in a gendered world or within a
gendered institution does not operate in a neutral manner. There are
more and more empirical studies that indicate that women’s relative
positions have worsened in our new ungendered doctrinal world.”52
Such a “postegalitarian” stance, where equity and not equality under
the law is what is at stake, is a complex and admittedly problematic
stance. If women constitute a special case, in what ways do they do
so, and in what ways don’t they? And does such a position argue—
untenably—that all women are the same, and that they experience
the same harms in the same way? Such questions are at the heart of a
feminist analysis of law and literature.
Ellen Adelberg and Claudia Currie argue that formal “gender
neutrality” should be replaced by “gender sensitivity.”53 Such a sensi-
tivity should—and in many cases does—go hand in hand with a rec-
ognition of other identity markers as equally important, markers of
ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation. As Frances Olsen carefully
points out, “The issue between sameness and difference depends en-
tirely upon context. Women can be oppressed by same treatment and
they can be oppressed by different treatment. In some contexts differ-
ences should be deemphasised; in other contexts it would make no
sense to do so.”54 One critic who has been particularly strong in this
field is the criminologist Carol Smart. Instead of focusing on the idea
that law is sexist, or male, Smart prefers the notion that law is gen-
dered, which means that “we can begin to see the way in which law
insists on a specific version of gender differentiation, without having
to posit our own form of differentiation as some kind of starting or
finishing point.” She has famously concluded that “Woman is a gen-
dered subject position which legal discourse brings into being.”
Smart further argues that “[i]t is this Woman of legal discourse that
feminism must continue to deconstruct but without creating a nor-
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mative Woman who reimposes a homogeneity which is all too often
cast in our own privileged, white likeness.”55
According to Smart, law produces polarized and specific gender
differences.56 What is clear is that women are treated differently from
men under the law, despite assurances otherwise, and often (though
not always) to their detriment. Certainly critics have posited a “chiv-
alry” argument that suggests that female criminals benefit from the
judicial system’s inability to see a feminine woman as truly capable of
or culpable for violence, with the result that their sentences are some-
times lighter than those handed down for men. As Helen Birch
argues, “the judicial system, reflecting the attitudes of society as a
whole, often punishes women who step beyond the bounds of accept-
able female behaviour, while demonstrating a chivalric, paternal atti-
tude to those whose acts of violence can apparently be explained by
reference to their hormones (biology) or emotions (irrationality).”57
Studies have shown that particularly in relation to child deaths,
“[m]others were less likely than fathers to be convicted of murder or
to be sentenced to imprisonment, and were more likely to be given
probation and psychiatrist dispositions.”58 Anne Worrall argues that
women who do receive lighter sentences enter into a sort of quasi
contract, whereby they let their lives be defined and represented “pri-
marily in terms of [their] domestic, sexual, and pathological dimen-
sions.”59 Such a strategy sometimes works, with fines and probation
orders given where custodial sentences might be imposed; other
times, when women are defined as unnatural or ill-suited for domes-
tic duties, they actually find that this “contract” works against them.
Women who are violent are particularly at risk of this misreading.
Allison Morris and Ania Wilczynski suggest that “[v]iolent women
are usually presented by [criminologists] as ‘evil’—they have chosen
to act in a way which contradicts traditional views of women; as ‘mas-
culine’—they are not ‘really’ women; as ‘sad’—they could not cope
with social pressures; or as ‘mad’—they did not really know what they
were doing.”60 These characteristics recur with regularity in texts
about women, and even feminists are not entirely immune from
shorthand explanations for women’s (still aberrant) violence: “Femi-
nists too seem puzzled about how they should respond to women’s
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violence.l.l.l.l[T]hey seem unsure whether it betrays or supports fem-
inist causes.”61
This may be because the violent female criminal remains surpris-
ingly rare. In a September 2002 trawl of the LexisNexis online net-
work, the simple inputting of “women and crime” netted more
results than the system could handle (any search that generates more
than a thousand results is automatically redirected for further
refinement). Even when I limited the search in a variety of ways, the
result was the same. This was, apparently, a hot topic. When I
changed the keywords to “female criminals,” though, I found only
seven recent news reports, of which only three dealt with “real-life”
crime (the rest were film, stage, or book reviews). Of the three, one
was focused on the “special needs” of female offenders, another on a
specific, high-profile case in which a woman was an alleged accom-
plice to a child murderer, and the final was a sort of twenty-first-cen-
tury emotional phrenology course in which “criminal types”—both
men and women—were identified. In this admittedly unscientific
polling, the female criminal does not really exist. She is a phantasm,
created by authors and scriptwriters, and the (too large to quantify)
connection between women and crime is one of victimhood. Even
when statistics about the rise in female violence shock us (in the
United Kingdom, this has been insistently linked in newspaper
accounts to the loosening of moral prohibitions against excessive
alcohol intake), the reality is that with such low numbers of violent
incidents reported, any rise can look astronomical. The fact that the
number of female prisoners in the United Kingdom rose by 173 per-
cent since 1992 is shocking; that in July 2004 there were only 4,487
women in prison puts that figure into perspective, particularly as
another statistic shows that women account for only 6.1 percent of the
U.K. prison population. Of this 6.1 percent, only 17 percent were
imprisoned for violent crimes.62 Although the raw numbers of U.S.
women imprisoned are significantly higher than U.K. numbers,
female offenders represent only about 1 percent of the population of
U.S. women as a whole.63
Yet women continue to be fodder for what Sarah Wight and Alice
Myers call “excessive storytelling about women’s violence”; they
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argue that press reports of high-profile cases (examples include Myra
Hindley and Rose West in the United Kingdom; Aileen Wuornos and
Karla Faye Baker in the United States; and Karla Homolka in Cana-
da), as well as films and novels about female criminals, “can be seen
as a symptom of social anxiety about women’s roles and the perceived
abandonment of traditional femininity.”64 The role that perceptions of
femininity plays in the courtroom is a crucial aspect of this text. In
their article “Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism,” Heil-
brun and Resnik explored the case of Dixon vs. the United States, in
which a pregnant young woman killed her husband and claimed self-
defense (a defense which, to a lay person, seems utterly justified. He
was drunk, high on PCP, and wielding an iron bar, threatening both
Evelyn Dixon and her mother, when Ms. Dixon stabbed him in the
chest. It may be worth noting that Ms. Dixon was all of four foot
nine). Heilbrun and Resnik note that “[d]uring the trial, the prosecu-
tor reminded the jury several times that Ms. Dixon had not appeared
teary, helpless or fearful when she spoke to the police after her hus-
band’s death.”65 They therefore ask, “How much was the jury that
decided the case affected by the police and prosecutor’s report that
Ms. Dixon failed, when speaking about her husband’s death, to
appear conventionally female, that she did not cry, did not seem as
helpless or distraught as might have been expected?”66 Apparently,
Dixon’s real crime is her distance from societally acceptable feminin-
ity—a factor that is reiterated in almost all of the chapters that follow,
whether in relation to real-life cases such as Aileen Wuornos’s trial, or
fictional cases where women do not act (and therefore are not?) like
stereotypical women.
The performance and punishment of femininity is thus one strand
that this feminist law and literature text explores. Another equally
important strand is the way in which women’s harms are misrecog-
nized and misidentified by the law and those charged with upholding
it. Robin West explores in full the way in which this might occur and
suggests that, because of their differing experiences, women and men
lead essentially different kinds of lives. She argues that men face spo-
radic violence while women face pervasive violence, or fear of vio-
lence, and that this has an effect on patterns of behavior: “one
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responds to pervasive fear and pervasive threat not by changing one’s
behavior, but by redefining oneself.”67 West further argues that both
liberal and radical feminists, by focusing on the first half of the term
that describes them, unwittingly deny or downplay the plight of
women. West argues that liberal feminists, whose goal is equality, do
not recognize that women often act in order not to increase their own
happiness, but to increase the happiness of others. Thus, she con-
trasts the liberal self (male) with the “giving self” (female): “women
define themselves as giving selves so as to obviate the threat, the dan-
ger, the pain, and the fear of being self-regarding selves from whom
their sexuality is taken.”68
West argues that even feminist victories result sometimes in oxy-
morons, and she uses as examples the terms “date rape” and “sexual
harassment.” West deconstructs the link between pleasure (“date,”
“sexual”) and pain (“rape,” “harassment”) to offer proof of a gendered
(legal) view of the world.69 Finally, in an oft-quoted passage, West
starkly sets out the way that the law is stacked against a real under-
standing of women’s experiences:
Thus, women’s distinctive, gender-specific injuries are now or have in the
recent past been variously dismissed as trivial (sexual harassment on the
street); consensual (sexual harassment on the job); humorous (nonviolent
marital rape); participatory, subconsciously wanted or self-induced
(father/daughter incest); natural or biological, and therefore inevitable
(childbirth); sporadic, and conceptually continuous with gender-neutral
pain (rape, viewed as a crime of violence); deserved or private (domestic vio-
lence); nonexistent (pornography); incomprehensible (unpleasant and
unwanted consensual sex) or legally predetermined (marital rape, in states
with the marital exemption).70
As if in agreement, Resnik notes that “[a]s women make visible a dis-
tinctive array of experiences and then gain power to alter laws and
reframe contexts, counterclaims of neutrality and timeless truths
attempt to quiet these voices and diminish their power.”71 It is at this
point that a postegalitarian stance is most needed. It is also at this
point, to follow from Resnik’s earlier work with Heilbrun, that the call
to listen to women’s stories must continue to be heard.
Perhaps one of the best-known legal storytellers is Patricia J.
Williams, whose ground-breaking book, The Alchemy of Race and
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Rights (1991), struggled to articulate the way in which gender and eth-
nicity are inevitably intertwined and contested parts of identity.
Williams’s book offers a personal account of encounters with the law,
both inside and outside the classroom. Williams argues that law
schools invoke issues of race, gender, and class in apparent response to
feminist and other concerns, but that they do so in ways that maintain
the hegemony of privilege. Moreover, she argues that gratuitous inser-
tions of these factors into law exams, insertions that offer up stereotypi-
cal portraits of black perpetrators and white victims, amount to “a deep
misunderstanding of the struggle, a misunderstanding that threatens to
turn the quest for empowering experiential narrative into permission
for the most blatant expressions of cynical stereotypification.”72 At the
same time, Williams contends that scholars must take the risk of
rejecting impersonal writing styles if they want transformation: “I also
believe that the personal is not the same as “private”: the personal is
often highly particular. I think the personal has fallen into disrepute as
sloppy because we have lost the courage and vocabulary to describe it
in the face of the enormous social pressure to ‘keep it to ourselves’—
but this is where our most idealistic and our deadliest politics are
lodged, and are revealed.”73 This form of scholarship is not without its
detractors: Anne Coughlin, for example, questions the viability of
“outsider scholarship,” which attempts to insert personal narratives in
order to disrupt the law’s seeming objectivity. While recognizing some
benefits of (or arguments for) outsider scholarship—the name given to
scholarship from those who claim that their voice is rarely heard under
the law—Coughlin is hard on the scholars who promote either out-
sider scholarship or autobiographical narrative as a radical way for-
ward.74 Coughlin’s argument is that “reliance on the narrative form is
problematic for those pursuing a radical social agenda, for some theo-
rists have argued that narrative is made possible by and inevitably rein-
forces the reigning system of law.”75
Clearly, not all feminists think alike, and some even deny the
applicability of the term (West, for example, claims a humanist stance
in Narrative, Authority, and Law). Others decry the “failures” of femi-
nist movements: one such critic is Thérèse Murphy, whose blunt arti-
cle is scathing about critics who cannot deal with the “sexed body”;
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her approach seemingly blames the victim in many respects, howev-
er, and remains problematic as a result.76 Thus, in taking a postegali-
tarian feminist stance in this text, I am not assuming that women
speak with the same voice, merely that their many voices need to be
heard—and even contested. I will draw on many feminist voices (and
some which claim no allegiance to feminism) in my book because I
still believe in Annette Kolodny’s “playful pluralism” as the best way
forward for feminist thinking.77 In her award-winning essay from 1979,
“Dancing through the Minefield,” Kolodny argues that such a stance
means that feminists can “enter a dialectical process of examining,
testing, even trying out the contexts—be they prior critical assump-
tions or explicitly stated ideological stances (or some combination of
the two)—that lead to disparate readings.”78
Despite their opposing stances, then, what Williams and Cough-
lin agree on is the relationship between narrative and law: law as a
story. Where they differ is in how such stories can be told, and
whether the old cry “the personal is political” has any merit whatsoev-
er. I understand Coughlin’s objections: personal narratives are not
automatically radical or disruptive, and too often they can simply
reinforce the status quo. As Resnik has argued, it is all too easy to dis-
regard stories by means of “discounting” the importance of the story
or “discrediting” its source: “An individual story can be rejected based
on a belief that it is not true, or, if true, not troubling, or if troubling,
not common but a singular event that is aberrant rather than abhor-
rent. In contrast, to discredit a story is always to attempt affirmatively
to dislodge authority.”79
Too often, as Resnik has noted throughout her scholarship, it is
the woman’s story that is denied and the woman herself who is dis-
credited. Or, as Kim Lane Scheppele argues, “the ‘we’ constructed in
legal accounts has a distinctive selectivity, one that tends to adopt the
stories of those who are white and privileged and male and lawyers,
while casting aside the stories and experiences of people of color, of
the poor, of women, of those who cannot describe their experiences
in the language of the law.”80 Scheppele is concerned with the experi-
ence of those whose stories are disbelieved, suggesting that they “live
in a legally sanctioned ‘reality’ that does not match their percep-
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tions.”81 It is in this context that one can explore the fictional or
fictionalized stories of women’s encounters with the law. Taking as a
starting point either the disbelief accorded the woman before the
court or her own self-censorship about her experiences, I argue that
twentieth-century writers from the United States, Canada, and Brit-
ain imagine fates for their heroines which rely on silence and gaps,
which explore the stories that cannot be told. As Maria Aristodemou
argues, “To interrogate the messages created and inscribed by both
legal and literary fictions we must go back not only to the narratives
they tell but to the language they employ to tell their stories.”82 Ironi-
cally, many of these tales invoke silence as a defining feature and ren-
der the primary subject mute; as a result, issues of guilt and inno-
cence become related less to actual crimes than to the perceived
relinquishing of the “feminine.” Moreover, guilt is sometimes as-
signed as a cover for another, possibly less acceptable crime. A case in
point is Morley Callaghan’s “A Wedding-Dress,” which acts here as a
short case study.83
“A Wedding-Dress”: A Tale of Legal Desire
Gary Boire argues that Morley’s short story “ironizes the sentimen-
tal tale, vignette, and sketch” while simultaneously functioning as
“an exercise in sexist pathos.”84 In it, Lena Schwartz is a woman who
has been engaged for fifteen years, awaiting her lover’s ability to sup-
port her financially: she is constantly in the state of deferral, of void,
as she awaits the beginning of her tale. When her lover finally lands a
good job, she lands in prison—accused of stealing a dress from a
department store. She wears the dress itself to the prison cell and in
court the next day; thus, there is no doubt about her guilt. (Here, as
in the fiction that I explore throughout Courting Failure, appearances
matter.) But what is she actually guilty of? Theft, according to the
store detective; temporary kleptomania, according to her lawyer. But
her guilt is, in fact, related less to her “crime” than to her desire: to be
beautiful, admired, and desired herself.
This sparse short story enacts a tale of compulsory heterosexuality
and delineates the regulation of female desire; indeed, it appears that
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this is the whole premise of the law in relation to Lena Schwartz. She
is called an “old maid” four times in the five-page text, her unmarried
state a matter for prurient rumination and disapproval. She is called
an old maid first by men at a boardinghouse, who salaciously suggest
that “it” is about to “happen to her” at long last; second, by a “saucy-
looking” salesgirl who is set up in opposition to her as a young, desir-
able woman (at thirty-two, Lena is no longer considered remotely
desirable herself); third, by a sergeant who feels that being an “old
maid” is reason enough to keep her in cells overnight, since old
maids tend to be “foxy”—in the wily sense, of course, not the sexual
one. The “wisdom” that accrues to the (slightly) older woman cannot
coexist with sexuality in the narratives that seek to set up women in
binary opposition to each other. Finally, she is called an old maid by
the magistrate, who notes that the dress that she has stolen “doesn’t
even look good on her” (57); thus, the theft itself is doubly inappro-
priate. However, he is lenient enough to let her go, so long as her
fiancé pays for the dress and promises to marry her. Clearly, once she
moves from the position of single (unrestrained?) woman, she will no
longer be a threat. She will be containable and indeed renamed: no
longer an old maid, no longer Miss Schwartz.
It is a slight story, almost dry in its narration, and unlikely to
arouse great sympathy or intense feeling. Yet, as Boire comments, the
text itself simultaneously hides and unmasks signs of Lena’s sexuality
“as a potentially unruly force—a force that she herself finds alienat-
ing”—indeed unspeakable.85 After such a long wait to get married (in
traditional narrative terms, to either begin her story or to end it), Lena
is denied a voice in the text even as her body enacts covert sexual mes-
sages. She intends to buy a “charming” but “serviceable” dress for her
long-awaited wedding, yet confronted with just such a dress, she is dis-
appointed. The dress she envisions is one that will “keep alive the
tempestuous feeling in her body,” a dress which will “startle” her
fiancé, but more importantly, perhaps, make her “wantonly attrac-
tive” and “slyly watched” by other men (54). Lena herself appears
unaware of the contradictions of her desires. However, once she sur-
reptitiously slips the dress into her coat, she feels “a guilty feeling of
satisfied exhaustion” (54, 55), a reaction that can clearly be read as sex-
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ual orgasm. Moreover, she feels almost immediate regret, crying
because she doesn’t know how to return the dress: that is, return to her
previous, unblemished (virgin?) existence. It is no coincidence that
the dress is “loose” on her, as it represents metonymically her own
imagined state.
The law is not long in getting involved in regulating Lena’s desire,
and from the moment she is arrested, she is told not to speak. As the
sergeant who picks her up says, “it won’t do any good to talk about it”
(56). Despite this prohibition, Lena speaks “almost garrulously,” ac-
cording to the text, but we as readers are denied her words. Moreover,
her lawyer never engages her in conversation; instead, he consults her
fiancé and argues for clemency on the basis of her long wait for mar-
riage. Her fiancé also speaks for rather than to her, calling her “a good
woman, a very good woman” (58), containing her within a proper,
gendered space.
“What makes Lena Schwartz’s trial so interesting,” according to
Boire, “is that it functions within the story, not simply as a tragi-comic
resolution, but as a male-centred normalizing ritual.”86 With only
men speaking, and only their thoughts recorded—apart from a brief,
if telling, note that Lena felt “strong and resentful” (57)—the trial
becomes a series of conversations within which the principal subject
is excluded, indeed, almost invisible. The actants in the courtroom
find Lena amusing or pathetic, and Lena herself becomes little more
than a cipher. As Boire comments, “Whereas up to this point Lena
has been portrayed as a sexualized body whose energy is potentially
transgressive (indeed wanton!), here in the legal rituals of normaliza-
tion her desires are placed squarely back within the confines of a
mandated heterosexual marriage.”87
This is in marked contrast to the other woman who is on trial that
day, a “coloured woman” accused of running a bawdy-house, who
“went to jail for two months rather than pay a fine of $200” (57). Of
the fate of the male prisoners who share Lena’s journey from prison
to courtroom—a bigamist, a betting shop owner, and a drunk—we
hear nothing. What we do have recorded is the fact that the female is
put away, her “sexuality” reduced to commerce and further connect-
ed with money through an imposed fine, or sent away—into a mar-
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riage that is intended to sublimate her unruly passions. What is also
clear is that the brothel madam, a woman who commodifies the
female body and who may thus invoke our moral disapproval, is
allowed to choose her fate, whereas the old maid Lena’s fate is chosen
for her. In this way, then, it appears that stepping outside of “proper”
gender roles (and, of course, the madam’s ethnicity cannot be
ignored) can potentially afford more space for movement. This read-
ing reveals the text as a subversive one which undermines the law and
the societal rules that it apparently upholds.
According to Boire, “the very prevalence of legal imagery suggests
that when Callaghan ‘reads’ the world (and therefore its language) in
his writing, he simultaneously ‘reads’ and interrogates their organiza-
tion by means of power relations, by means of legal formulae.”88 In “A
Wedding-Dress,” this results in a text in which a real crime (theft)
stands in for a seemingly more disturbing and indeed disruptive
“crime” (female sexuality). The court enforces repression and bound-
aries (as part of her release, Lena is forbidden to shop for a year) and
in doing so, reestablishes “appropriate” power relations. The text
ends, “and they went out to be quietly married”—no doubt to live
“happily ever after.” “A Wedding-Dress” is a legal fairy tale, in which
the heroine is tempted from the path, comes to potential harm, but is
rescued by her handsome prince and led back to safety.
Taking on Weisberg’s claim that it is possible to read for feminist
messages in male-authored texts, “A Wedding-Dress” proves his point
(and indeed many feminists have made this critical claim more elo-
quently and more persuasively than Weisberg). But Morley’s text—
like the plays, novels, and films that follow—focuses on the female,
on her experience of or relation to the law. If she is sidelined (as
clearly in the text she is, despite being its protagonist), then this
sidelining has a political import.
In the chapters that follow, I explore more closely a range of issues
to do with women and the law, returning to the critical debates about
how the figure of the (fictional) woman is constructed, how her
crimes and misdemeanors are detailed, and how she relates to the
embodied lives of contemporary women. Because we trace much of
our legal and literary understandings back to previous centuries, I felt
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it was necessary to explore, in chapter 1, how twentieth-century
authors recalled and reinvented nineteenth-century concerns over
women’s legal culpabilities. Focusing on representations of the panop-
ticon, as well as Foucauldian and feminist readings of this space, chap-
ter 1 examines Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus (1984), Margaret
Atwood’s Alias Grace (1996), and Sarah Waters’s Affinity (1999) as texts
that explore appearance and the construction of the (legal) gaze. Giv-
en the role that surveillance—whether real or imagined—plays in
women’s lives, the focus of this chapter is on the disciplinary gaze of
the authorities and of institutions of correction. Carter, Atwood, and
Waters, however, subvert the hierarchical notion of powerless prison-
ers and powerful authorities. The women inmates in these texts find
ways to wrest control from those who seemingly have power over
them. Each of these texts is a reconstruction of nineteenth-century
imprisonment, and I explore how writers make use of “real” sites—
Millbank Prison in London, Kingston Penitentiary in Ontario, Cana-
da—to write beyond the ending of women’s imprisonment and see
beyond the panoptical gaze that initially appears inescapable.
Chapter 2 follows logically from chapter 1 and also focuses on
twentieth-century texts that reconstruct or mimic nineteenth-century
ones. In this chapter, however, I explore “neoslave narratives,” texts
that offer voice to the disenfranchised, the dehumanized, and the
brutalized, and that recall the authentic slave narratives of earlier
centuries. This chapter examines how African American women have
been historically viewed as “property” and the ways in which their
family lives have been constructed around the selling and buying of
human beings. Thus, it necessarily engages with constructions of
family, and especially the role of motherhood, in a system that denied
blood relations and treated human beings as chattel. As one of the
characters in Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987) reveals, “What she
called the nastiness of life was the shock she received upon learning
that nobody stopped playing checkers just because the pieces includ-
ed her children.”89 Beloved is a reworking of the “story” of the histori-
cal Margaret Garner. Other fictional slave narratives explored in
chapter 2 include J. California Cooper’s Family (1991), Sherley Anne
Williams’s Dessa Rose (1986), and Valerie Martin’s Property (2003).
26 Courting Failure
These novels all explore legal and extralegal remedies for violence,
the misnaming of humans as chattel, and covert theft versus property
rights; each also ensures that the female slave is offered at least a par-
tial voice. Williams’s novel, like Morrison’s, is partly based on authen-
tic slave experiences and offers a fictionalized account of what might
have happened if two historical women—a pregnant slave awaiting
the death penalty and a white woman harboring runaways—had met;
the novel is also a writing back against the misnaming of the slave
experience. Cooper’s novel explores inheritance and uses the trope of
the covertly swapped child, so that the “rightful” heir to a plantation
ends up a slave, and a slave’s child becomes master. Finally, Martin’s
novel takes the white woman slaveholder’s perspective, offering a par-
tial and privileged account of the institution of slavery that challenges
facile connections between white women and slaves. The inclusion
of a text by a European American in this chapter is deliberate, in
order to counter any essentialist or separatist notion in relation to lit-
erature’s authorizing voices.
Following from discussions of race and motherhood, chapter 3
explores the construction of the “good mother” and the “bad mother”
in both literature and society, and how such roles bring women into
conflict with the law. “Real life” examples include the media circuses
that surrounded the trials of Andrea Pia Yates, the mentally ill Texan
mother who drowned her five children in the family bath in 2001,
and Susan Smith, the South Carolina mother who drove her car into
a lake with her children still inside in 1994. Filicide—the killing of a
child by its parent—is more common than the general public likes to
admit; when that parent is a mother, the crime appears to be a betray-
al of all that a mother is supposed to stand for: comfort, care, love,
protection. Indeed, this chapter engages with the supposed innate
maternal instinct and explores how such myths falsely divide those
who are “deserving” and those who are not. In A Map of the World
(1996), by Jane Hamilton, for example, a farm woman who negligent-
ly causes a child’s death is later accused of sustained abuse of another
child in her care: here, an accidental death is misread as a clue to the
woman’s monstrous nature. In The Good Mother (1986), by Sue
Miller, a mother’s position as mother is undermined by the fact that
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she conducts a sexual relationship with a man who is not the father of
her daughter. This alone is enough to brand her a bad mother; thus,
when the ultimate taboo—child sexual abuse—is alleged, it is clear
to see that this mother will have to relinquish her role, despite no
wrongdoing on her part. Finally, in Midwives (1997), by Chris Boh-
jalian, the death of a pregnant woman under the care of an unli-
censed midwife leads to a manslaughter charge and a legal review of
how childbirth is experienced and controlled. In Midwives as in the
other texts, guilt and crime take on a variety of meanings. In all three
texts, trials are central to the narratives but, more importantly, each in
some way interrogates how motherhood itself is regulated.
Almost every text compares, in at least a small way, a courtroom to
the theater, with participants acting their roles, well or not so well,
the scripts prepared and either stuck to or ad-libbed. Chapter 4 thus
moves away from novels and into the theater. This chapter explores
the way in which twentieth-century drama evokes “unruly” or outlaw
women and overtly stages their guilt or innocence within the space of
a courtroom setting. Here, the idea of women on display becomes
most apparent, and the way in which women’s voices become co-opt-
ed is overtly challenged. Indeed, as Judith Resnik argues, “Women lit-
erally lacked juridical voice. Until quite recently, women were the
objects of the discussion, as property, as victims, as defendants, but
not the authors, the speakers, the witnesses, the lawyers, the judges, or
the jurors.”90 This partial or occluded voice has preoccupied feminist
critics and playwrights for most of the last century, and representative
plays that engage with this idea include Sophie Treadwell’s Machinal
(1928), Susan Glaspell’s Trifles (1916), Sharon Pollock’s Blood Rela-
tions (1981), and Sarah Daniels’s Masterpieces (1984). Each of these
texts is based on or references real-life murder trials.
In this chapter I explore what Jennifer Wood describes as “usurpa-
tory ventriloquism”—the authority to speak and act for others—that is
inscribed in the asymmetrical power relations of the court and played
out on the stage.91 Treadwell’s Machinal is loosely based on the his-
torical Ruth Snyder, and the “Young Woman” on trial finds that legal
language does her a disservice; she is unable to let her lawyer’s words
speak for themselves. Similarly, Glaspell’s and Pollock’s plays engage
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with issues of voice and ventriloquism, the staging of femininity, and
the central vexing question of why some women choose to murder.
Pollock’s play reinvents Lizzie Borden and playfully offers the audi-
ence an actress playing an actress playing Borden herself. Finally,
Daniels’s Masterpieces explores how crimes against women are mis-
named, as West has indicated; issues to do with rape, pornography,
sexual harassment, and prostitution are all explored from a gendered
point of view, and the central character refuses, as Treadwell’s Young
Woman does, to allow the court to represent her falsely. Chapter 4
thus explores the ways in which guilt and innocence are “staged,” as
well as how drama itself works as a complicating arena for the explo-
ration of women and the law.
Chapter 5 examines the complex relationship between women
and the law in television series and television movies, as well as block-
buster films. As Adelberg and Currie contend, “Media images of
courtrooms, prisons, and criminal acts serve as the source of public
knowledge about offenders. Particularly in the case of women, these
images are hugely distorted from reality.”92 This chapter includes a
discussion of the 1930 Motion Picture Production Code, which gov-
erned the moral messages of films and forced filmmakers to ensure a
“proper” reading of the law. Such a code obviously affected how films
regarding crime were made. I explore in this final chapter both the
real-life tragic lawbreaker as reinvented on screen (Aileen Wuornos in
Monster, Barbara Graham in I Want to Live!) as well as the comic
lawmaker (Amanda Bonner in Adam’s Rib, Elle Woods in Legally
Blonde). I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the television
series Ally McBeal, a critically contested, postmodern, postfeminist
series that has provoked a great deal of debate about the appearance
of women before the court.
The title of my book, Courting Failure, is more than just a play on
words; it is an assertion of the tension that necessarily exists between
the supposedly gender-blind law and the gender-influenced society
that creates the law. In my conclusion, optimistically entitled “Court-
ing Success,” I revisit many of the questions raised in the preceding
chapters. Criminology has long treated the female offender as “oth-
er,” and feminist analyses are a necessary counterpoint for this one-
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sided portrait. Interdisciplinary studies such as law and literature also
make a much-needed contribution to this debate. This monograph is
an attempt to explore just a few of the implications of the space
accorded the female offender, whether fictional or real, and to begin
to discuss some aspects of confinement and release that characterize
her position. Looking forward, the conclusion surveys the critical
debates and asks what the future holds for women and the law. As
writers engage with the space of legislated patriarchy and subvert fur-
ther the grounds upon which women are judged, they open up
spaces in the courtrooms that will not be filled with women’s silence
but with (as Heilbrun and Resnik hopefully prophesized and I noted
at the beginning of this introduction) women’s “right to anger, their
use of powerl.l.l.l[and] their noncomplicity in the role of sex
object.”93 A key text here is the long-listed Booker Prize novel Critical
Injuries (2001), by Joan Barfoot, which explores the hotly debated
issues of restorative justice and grace. Such texts open out, rather
than close down, the arena in which women tackle the law, and it is
thus fitting that Courting Failure should end with a discussion of this
challenging and important text.
In 1989, when Heilbrun and Resnik first published their article
“Convergences,” the law and literature movement was, Resnik argues,
“indifferent to the rich infusion of feminist theory in literature depart-
ments and to the claims that feminist jurisprudence was making in
law.”94 A year later, Harvard Women’s Law Journal devoted a sig-
nificant portion of volume 13 to law and literature. Throughout the
1990s, important edited collections on women and the law were pub-
lished, including Representing Women: Law, Literature and Femi-
nism, edited by Susan Sage Heinzelman and Zipporah Batshaw Wise-
man, and Beyond Portia: Women, Law, and Literature in the United
States, edited by Jacqueline St. Joan and Annette Bennington, as well
as monographs such as Robin West’s Narrative, Authority, and Law.
In the early part of the twenty-first century, many more texts are
successfully engaging with the variety of experiences that women—
both fictional and real—participate in or react to. It is in the spirit of
contributing to this debate that Courting Failure proceeds. From
invented nineteenth-century texts to the big screen, from plays to tel-
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evision drama, the figure of the woman in conflict with the law offers
us an opportunity to explore how a postegalitarian stance can reframe
the questions—and the answers—that face those of us who have an
interest in society and the law.
Chapter One
Prison, Passion, and the Female Gaze
Twentieth-century women writers engage in metaphorical rewrit-
ings of the panopticon, inserting explicit and implicit references to it
within many of their novels on women and the law. Designed by Jere-
my Bentham as an “inspection-house” and made famous by Michel
Foucault’s incisive reading of it, the panopticon is a place to set aside
and observe the criminal, the damaged, or the subject who needs to
be contained. Its central watchtower overlooking a circular arrange-
ment of back-lit chambers, or cells, ensures that the prisoner believes
herself to be threatened with observation at all times. The apparently
constant gaze here becomes linked to punishment, with the observed
prisoner always at risk of being caught breaking the rules. The result
is an internalization of the law, of propriety, and a “new mode of
obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without
example.”1 Foucault analyzes how the gaze becomes internalized,
and feminist critics such as Sandra Lee Bartky have added a correc-
tive to his work by exploring the implications of gender in relation to
the power structures of the panopticon.
Such is the power of this image that women writers of the twenti-
eth century utilize its imposing structure in their own explorations of
women, power, and the law. Thus, we have Angela Carter exploring
the labyrinths of power and the gaze in her fantastic novel, Nights at
the Circus (1984), Margaret Atwood examining the role of the gazed
upon within and outside prison walls in Alias Grace (1996), and, per-
haps most overtly, Sarah Waters investigating the “queer” effects of
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the panopticon on inmates and visitors alike in her novel Affinity
(1999). These writers subvert the hierarchical notion of the prisoner
as powerless, the authorities as powerful; the women inmates in the
texts above turn from gaze to touch, find the power in being gazed
upon, or harness the illusion of control for their own purposes. More-
over, in explicitly or implicitly seeking “improper” relationships, these
fictional prisoners step outside their prisons and wrest control from
those who seek to contain them.
While the purpose of the panopticon, as Foucault reminds us, is
“to see constantly and recognize immediately,”2 in these fictional
texts of the nineteenth-century gaze, sight and recognition are far
from equivalent. Indeed, it is in their very mapping of misrecogni-
tions that they exert their force. Carter’s female murderesses reject
the part offered to them of penitent sinner and refuse to express
repentance, even though they know such a stance will keep them in
thrall to a governess’s pitiless gaze. Alternatively, Atwood’s fictional-
ized Grace Marks willingly (and willfully?) plays the part of mad-
woman, murderess, and wrongfully accused. Finally, Selina Dawes,
the “wrongfully” imprisoned spiritualist in Waters’s Affinity, uses
shadows and illusion—the central mechanisms of the panopticon—
in order to control Margaret, her link to the outside world. In each of
these texts, the female gaze constructs the love object; in Alias Grace,
it even incorporates it, as Grace Marks “becomes” Mary Whitney, her
friend and spectral conspirator.
The gaze has long been a subject of feminist analysis, with Laura
Mulvey’s article “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” kick-start-
ing the exploration of how the male gaze is normalized in film.3
Scopophilia, or pleasure in looking, is clearly gendered. As Bartky
acknowledges, “Under male scrutiny, women will avert their eyes or
cast them downward; the female gaze is trained to abandon its claim
to the sovereign status of seer.”4 Bartky further argues that “a panopti-
cal male connoisseur resides within the consciousness of most
women: they stand perpetually before his gaze and under his judg-
ment. Woman lives her body as seen by another, by an anonymous
patriarchal Other.”5 It is this patriarchal Other who is the implicit
subject of each of the novels that I analyze here, as the women who
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are being watched take control themselves, subverting the underlying
principles of the panopticon for their own ends. In what follows, I will
explore Nights at the Circus, Alias Grace, and Affinity as texts which
utilize and subvert the power of the panopticon, inserting instead a
feminine gaze that allows for illusion, performance, and subversive
control.
Nights at the Circus: A Women’s Panopticon?
Joanne Gass argues that Angela Carter’s Nights at the Circus
explores “the ways in which the dominant, frequently male-centered
discourses of power marginalize those whom society defines as freaks
(l.l.l.lin particular, women) so that they may be contained and con-
trolled because they are all possible sources of the chaotic disruption
of established power.”6 In all aspects, then, and in all arenas where
Carter’s women perform (the circus of the title, the brothel, the freak
show, and, in particular, the prison), power is central to the narrative.
As is typical for Carter, though, such power is asserted only to be sub-
verted. This is particularly apparent in her structuring of the prison as
a panopticon. In contrast to Alias Grace and Affinity, the prison in
Nights at the Circus serves as little more than an aside in the fantastic
tale of Fevvers, Carter’s central, peripatetic winged woman. Indeed,
the idea of a prison as an “aside”—a place to set aside and forget—
makes the panoptical images particularly intriguing. Carter spends a
mere two chapters exploring the panopticon before she allows her
female prisoners the freedom to vanish from the prison and the text.
What she does in this space, however, remains central to a feminist
reading of punishment and release.
The Countess P., aware of her own guilt in relation to the poison-
ing of her husband, sets up a “private asylum for female criminals.”7
The narrator cautions, “Do not run away with the idea it was a sense
of sisterhood that moved her.” Indeed, in each of these texts, the con-
cept of sisterhood is undermined, even as female relationships
become central to the narratives, through design or desire. The
Countess P. believes herself to be “a kind of conduit for the means of
the repentance of the other murderesses” (210). Unpunished herself,
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she remains thus unforgiven, and can only approximate her own pen-
itence through building a penitentiary for others:
It was a panopticon she forced them to build, a hollow circle of cells shaped
like a doughnut, the inward-facing wall of which was composed of grids of
steel and, in the middle of the roofed, central courtyard, there was a round
room surrounded by windows. In that room she’d sit all day and stare and
stare and stare at her murderesses and they, in turn, sat all day and stared at
her. (210)
Carter’s explicit awareness of Foucault’s reading of the panopticon
becomes clear in the way that she appropriates his language to des-
cribe it. Carter notes, “During the hours of darkness, the cells were lit
up like so many small theatres in which each actor sat by herself in
the trap of her visibility” (211), words more than reminiscent of Fou-
cault’s description: “They are like so many cages, so many small the-
atres, in which each actor is alone.l.l.l.lVisibility is a trap.”8
Carter’s foray into the world of the panopticon starts with a factu-
al, dry tone, indicating the power of the prison, while occasionally let-
ting in a ray of humor. In one example, the narrator suggests that
“[t]here are many reasons, most of them good ones, why a woman
should want to murder her husband” (210). The dry third-person nar-
rative is disrupted by these insertions, as well as a later, second-person
insertion: “you were never alone, here, where her gaze was continual-
ly upon you, and yet you were always alone” (213). This change to
second-person voice implicates the reader, forcing us to join with the
inmates in our visible solitude. At the same time, it provokes the
question: are the inmates still imprisoned when we aren’t looking?
The convention of referring to textual events in the present tense sug-
gests that they are; the inmates are always stared at and staring back,
always in the moment of being watched. That the past tense does not
apply to discussions of textual events suggests no end to their impris-
onment, as they are imprisoned afresh each time a new reader gazes
upon the page. Thus, we become both prisoners (addressed as and
included in “you”) and prison wardens of a different kind in reading
about these events.
Carter’s postmodern and playful disruption of a stable position—
you, I, they—is also in evidence in the way that she takes Foucault’s
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reading one step further, acknowledging the manner in which the
gazer becomes imprisoned within this dynamic as well. The narrator
is aware of the countess’s own entrapment: “the price she paid for her
hypothetical proxy repentance was her own incarceration, trapped as
securely in her watchtower by the exercise of her power as its objects
were in their cells” (214). Moreover, the countess remains blind to this
fact (despite her constant gaze), while the prisoners themselves
acquire power through this knowledge. Furthermore, they realize, if
she does not, that they will never be freed from this prison, despite her
claim that she will release the truly penitent. Victims of male abuse,
these women seek not humility but justice, and find it through a dis-
ruption of the patterns of behavior governing wardens and inmates.
Thus Olga Alexandrovna leads an “army of lovers” when she final-
ly dares first to touch and then to gaze upon her female warden, break-
ing the power of isolation and containment. Here, the prisoner breaks
with what Bartky calls “the economy of touching.”9 Bartky argues that
who touches whom, how often, and where, is influenced by hierarchi-
cal organizations of power. Thus, the powerless (in Bartky’s example,
women) suffer inappropriate touch (a grope, a slap) in ways that men
do not, because men are licensed to touch women; they hold more
power. In Carter’s novel, this power is reversed; it is the prisoner who
touches first and who breaks the boundary between prisoner and war-
den. Once touch is established—as loving, and as desirable—then
gaze follows, at first surreptitiously, and then more boldly.
Emboldened by mutual desire, the women in the prison begin
longing, loving relationships and overthrow the central power of the
countess to effect their own release and freedom. Appropriately,
“[t]hey left the countess secured in her observatory with nothing to
observe any longer but the spectre of her own crime, which came in
at once through the open gate to haunt her as she continued to turn
round and round in her chair” (218). If sisterhood, in its idealized rep-
resentation, suggests a loving relationship and a lack of violence and
aggression, it does not preclude, it seems, the meting out of justice.
Carter’s exploration of the panopticon reveals the way in which
the authoritative gaze inscribed by the panopticon is subverted, once
the gazed-upon understand the mutually imprisoning aspect of this
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look. Moreover, her novel explores how these imprisoned and “docile”
bodies (as Foucault has it) assert themselves as uncontainable, their
pleasures released from normative control.
Kingston Penitentiary, Alias Grace,
and the Object of a Panoptical Gaze
In Atwood’s Alias Grace, imprisonment lasts much longer and
takes more than one form. The historical Grace Marks was impris-
oned for over twenty-eight years for her part in the murder of her
employer, Thomas Kinnear. Kinnear’s housekeeper-mistress, Nancy
Montgomery, was also murdered, but neither Marks nor her co-
accused, James McDermott, was ever convicted of this offense: in the
historical record, it is the murder of a wealthy landowner—a man—
that truly counts. Marks was primarily confined in Kingston Peniten-
tiary, Ontario, and finally pardoned in 1872, after which she disap-
peared from public record.
Kingston Penitentiary, perhaps because of its unique history as the
first federal prison in the Canadian criminal justice system, has seen
its share of literary representations. In the same year that Alias Grace
was published, Merilyn Simonds’s The Convict Lover: A True Story
(1996) also appeared.10 Photographs of the prison and its prisoners pro-
vide proof of the story’s truth. Simonds’s nonfictional text explores the
female as lovesick dupe, not criminal (a position or role also potential-
ly undertaken by Grace Marks). In 1919, in the village of Portsmouth,
a young woman, Phyllis Halliday, became the willing correspondent
with and go-between for a convict, who signed himself “DaDy Long
Legs” in missives asking for tobacco and promising affection.
Simonds reconstructs the probable narrative behind the correspon-
dence, of which only the prisoner’s half remains. Like Atwood,
Simonds constructs the story from fragments that are lodged in
Queen’s University Archives in Kingston, Ontario; she also acknowl-
edges the many memoirs and other texts written about Kingston Peni-
tentiary, including Roger Caron’s well-known Go Boy (1978).
Simonds traces two years of correspondence, during which time
Phyllis risked her reputation and possible legal action for supplying
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contraband. The man, simply known as “the prisoner” to begin with,
is offered a number, g852, before he is identified as Joseph Cleroux,
though even this name is but one of several aliases. Simonds relied
on historical documents in addition to the correspondence she
uncovered in the attic of her own Kingston house, factors that are
clear in the descriptions of the prison itself and the people who popu-
late it. The Convict Lover explores what it means to be labeled a pris-
oner and how that label follows the prisoner wherever he goes. As
Simonds notes, “According to the [Penitentiary] Act, wherever a con-
vict set foot was penitentiary land, and so the boundaries of Ports-
mouth village flexed as the prison work gangs passed.”11 That there is
no escape from this label accords with contemporary investigations of
the panopticon, a prison structure meant to enact the threat of con-
stant surveillance while inhibiting the prisoner’s ability to see.12
Kingston Penitentiary was at least partly based on the ideal panopti-
con first described by Jeremy Bentham in his letters of 1787.
Kingston Penitentiary is thus symbolically important as a site of
incarceration for Ontario and beyond. As the location of historical
confinement and literary release, Kingston Penitentiary was built to
be one of the largest public buildings in Upper Canada. It was erect-
ed for five main reasons: “the death penalty was not being executed
for crimes less than murder, fines were unjust, local gaols were bad
because they lumped young offenders with seasoned criminals, cor-
poral punishment was improper and degrading, and banishment was
unenforceable and often no punishment at all.”13 The presence of a
British garrison as well as large quantities of stone ensured that Kings-
ton was an ideal site for this new prison. This admixture of moral and
material reasons ironically highlights the mixed messages implied by
the Canadian prison reform that Kingston Penitentiary represents.
In the article “The Kingston, Ontario Penitentiary and Moral
Architecture,” C. J. Taylor outlines the factors that contributed to the
development of the Kingston Penitentiary. As Taylor notes, its walls
“would allow the keeper to observe the prisoners through apertures
even when they were in their cells but would prevent the prisoners
from knowing whether or not they were being watched, giving the
impression of continuous surveillance.”14 In Bentham’s proposed
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panopticon, the purpose of this disjuncture between seeing and being
seen is clear. It is through being constantly visible that the inmate is
controlled:
the more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the
persons who should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose X of
the establishment have been attained. Ideal perfection, if that were the
object, would require that each person should actually be in that predica-
ment, during every instant of time. This being impossible, the next thing to
be wished for is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and
not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should conceive himself
to be so.15
Moreover, “[lateral] invisibility is a guarantee of order.”16 In other
words, the inability to see one’s fellow inmates prevented conspira-
cies, prison outbreaks, and organized unrest (though it did not, clear-
ly, prevent the fear of these events by authorities, as evidenced by the
liberation book questions put to inmates prior to their release).
Foucault argues that the panoptical mechanism is fundamentally
about power:
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of
power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects,
even if it is discontinuous in its action: that the perfection of power should
tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural appara-
tus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation inde-
pendent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be
caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.17
This is “moral” architecture at its height, a model prison that
ensures solitary confinement, social control, and moral reform. Tay-
lor’s reading of the purpose of this type of architecture is clear and
related to Foucault’s reading: “It was the architecture that should con-
strain and organize the inmate rather than the guard. In this way the
penitentiary system would seem to embody an abstract moral princi-
ple which the inmate was supposed to adhere to when he was
released.”18 Thus, the penitentiary’s role became linked to “a projec-
tion of the world as it should be. The penitentiary represented a com-
munity, although an artificial one, where the old values of obedience
by the lower orders to a higher power were implicit.”19 The relevance
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of this for Atwood’s text is clear: Grace Marks is a servant who, what-
ever her active or passive role in the murder of her employer, over-
stepped the mark of her social class.
If North American prison reformers—including the Boston Prison
Discipline Society, which was influential in the building of Kingston
Penitentiary—were responding to real concerns about prisoner
behavior, they were also, according to Taylor, responding to manufac-
tured concerns about the rise in immigration and urbanization as
threats to civilized society.20 In this context, it is no coincidence that
Grace Marks was also an immigrant, almost automatically, then,
deserving of punishment. Contemporary hysteria about immigration
levels clearly has a historical precedent.
Moral architecture, as Foucault reports, “arrests or regulates
movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of
individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it
establishes calculated distributions.”21 It keeps people in their place.
Such a recognition is important both for considering the Penitentiary
Act that stated that the penitentiary is wherever the prisoner is, as well
as for the way in which the immigrant—and social inferior—Grace
Marks is treated.
Atwood’s Grace Marks is sent to the insane asylum, the prison,
and, on separate but connected occasions, private homes in order to
“play out” her penitence. The historical Marks was a “celebrated
murderess” who was often paraded in front of tourists (Susanna
Moodie famously being one of them), but the story of her role in the
murders of Thomas Kinnear and Nancy Montgomery remains un-
clear. An immigrant and a servant, she had no real access to power—
except, perhaps, sexual power—and much media speculation existed
about her relationships both with Kinnear and with James McDer-
mott, the man who was hanged for Kinnear’s murder. Grace Marks
was young and, in some reports, attractive. Her gender and youth
spared her from the noose but not from public vilification. Indeed,
the fact that she was wearing the murdered woman’s clothes when
she was caught became a sign, at least for some, of her clear guilt.
Like Lena Schwartz in Callaghan’s short story, she was considered
visibly guilty as a result of her attire.22
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Atwood uses these details in her fictional recounting of Grace’s
life. In Atwood’s version, Grace is allowed limited freedom on occa-
sions and becomes a domestic helper to the prison governor’s wife,
acting as both servant and spectacle for the women who gather in this
private yet public home to gain illicit thrills from their proximity to
female violence. Confined by their respectability, the governor’s wife,
her companions, and her daughters live vicarious violence through a
crime scrapbook that mimics contemporary interest in true crime
narratives. Anita Biressi argues that an “emphasis upon secret and
occluded knowledge stems from an extreme transgression of accept-
able limits, a crossing of boundaries that seems to command a search
‘into the mind of the murderer.’” 23 Exactly what the gathered women
search for is not always clear, although their movement beyond
acceptable limits is:
The Governor’s wife cuts these crimes out of the newspapers and pastes
them in; she will even write away for old newspapers with crimes that were
done before her time. It is her collection, she is a lady and they are all col-
lecting things these days, and so she must collect something, and she does
this instead of pulling up ferns or pressing flowers, and in any case she likes
to horrify her acquaintances.24
Grace also notes that what the women are most interested in are
hints of sexuality: “They don’t care if I killed anyone, I could have cut
dozens of throats, it’s only what they admire in a soldier, they’d
scarcely blink. No: was I really a paramour, is their chief concern,
and they don’t even know themselves whether they want the answer
to be no or yes” (27). Atwood acknowledges here the regulating power
of gender roles, just as she had located gender as a chief component
in Grace Marks’s trial. Significantly, Grace fails to answer this ques-
tion.
In Atwood’s version, the prison governor’s wife defines herself as a
virtual prisoner of the penitentiary because her house is enclosed with-
in prison walls (24). The historical prison warden, John Creighton,
also defined his role as one of incarceration and necessary release. If
Carter’s warden is unwittingly enclosed within her prison, the histori-
cal warden Atwood relies on for her novel is ironically unaware of the
inappropriateness of his longing for release.
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The Warden’s Daily Journals of 1870–74 cover the period of
Grace Marks’s release and reference her specifically in 1872. The
entries are short, concerned primarily with the day-to-day running of
the prison, and the entering and exiting of the prison by the warden
himself. A representative entry, from Friday, January 5, 1872, runs
thus: “Entered Prison at half past 6 this morning and performed all
the duties of the day. I was absent from 3 to 5 for a little exercise, as I
find it injurious to my health to keep so close to work as I have been
lately. Left at 6 p.m.” Two weeks later, the warden notes that he left
the prison at 10 a.m. and “made a visit into the country, as I have been
closely confined and unwell for several days past.”25 Creighton
appears to find no irony in the fact that he is free to leave the prison
at will, while his wards are not able to have the same liberty. His
“confinement” is temporary and to an extent chosen, and his health
is clearly of a higher standard than those who are not allowed the lux-
ury of release.
However, Creighton appears to have been a prison reformer, a
man who was insulted when, in a letter to the editor of the Irish
Canadian on June 20, 1872, he was accused of behaving improperly
and with vengeance. The warden’s entry for June 28 gives a long and
heartfelt account of his actions and moral conscience. He appears
truly upset that his character has been maligned and suggests that an
unhappy warden has made the story up: “I feel in my conscience that
none of the men are punished cruelly or severely, and that it requires
more moral courage sometimes to refrain from punishing a bad man
than to inflict it.” Such sentiments indicate a progressive prison
regime, in hope if not in actuality.
Two entries from 1872 relate to Grace Marks herself. On Friday,
August 2, 1872, Creighton notes, “Same as yesterday except that I visit-
ed the city from 12 to 2 to see Minister of Justice about Grace Marks
whose pardon I received this morning. It was Sir John’s [Macdon-
ald’s] request that I and one of my daughters should accompany this
woman to a house provided for her in New York.” Five days later, the
entry reads:
Entered prison at 6 a.m. Was present in Dining Hall at Breakfast. Addressed
a few words to Convicts informing them that I was called away for a few days
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on Prison Business and that I hoped they would behave well in my absence.
Examined and discharged Grace Marks, Pardoned after being imprisoned in
this Penitentiary, 28 years and ten months. Started with her and my daugh-
ter for New York at 1:30 p.m. by order of the Minister of Justice, leaving Prison
in charge of Deputy Warden.
The day before her release, like all convicts on their discharge
from the penitentiary, Grace Marks was asked a series of “Liberation”
questions, which were recorded in the Liberation Question Book.26
Such questions concerned the conditions at the prison, the length of
incarceration of the inmate, and the authorities’ fears of a conspiracy;
thus, they move from enquiring about the prisoner’s experiences to
any knowledge she might have about what others were plotting
against the prison administration. Grace’s answers are almost always
single words—yes or no—and reveal no further information than is
strictly required. In this way, the historical Grace Marks is much like
Atwood’s construction of her: a withholding witness who refuses at
some level to tell her own story. Indeed, there are enough versions
around without her own contribution to create a multiple reading of
her guilt or innocence.
Atwood utilizes a gothic framework in order to obscure rather
than illuminate her heroine’s ultimate innocence or guilt. The gothic
framework becomes even more explicit in Waters’s Affinity, but in
Alias Grace, it serves to introduce multiple and fantastic readings of
pretrial events. Norman Holland and Leona Sherman identity the
gothic framework as one which includes the image of “woman-plus-
habitation and the plot of mysterious sexual and supernatural threats
in an atmosphere ofl.l.l.lmysteries.”27 Indeed, Atwood’s utilization of
ghosts, entrapping homes, and caddish men, with the female body as
prison, works within most of the definitions of the gothic that critics
offer. As Susanne Becker argues, the female gothic
plays an important role throughout the almost two centuries of modern
female culture: there has been a vigorous exchange of allusions and re-
visions, and even of provocations and answers, a dynamic—and self-con-
scious—writing and rewriting of feminine texts haunting one another:
around the interrogative texture of romantic love and female desire, of gen-
der construction between le propre and the monstrous-feminine, of the (con-
textualising) dynamics of domestic horror.28
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Romantic love, female desire, and domestic horror become
entwined in illicit ways in the text—as servant and master transgress
class boundaries (in relation to Kinnear and Montgomery, as well as
to Grace’s friend Mary Whitney and her master-lover), and as Grace
herself “becomes” the object of her own (unacknowledged) love
interest, Mary herself. Grace is presumed innocent or guilty by vari-
ous observers, but never herself explains fully her own reading of the
events. Peter Hutchings argues that “[l]ike the vampires with whom
they came to be associated, women are not reflected in murder’s mir-
ror.”29 Hutchings’s metaphors work well in relation to Atwood’s Alias
Grace. The novel provides us with several images of Grace in a mir-
ror, the most important of which has Grace looking in a mirror and
contemplating her own multiple descriptions:
I think of all the things that have been written about me—that I am an inhu-
man female demon, that I am an innocent victim of a blackguard forced
against my will and in danger of my own life, that I was too ignorant to know
how to act and that to hang me would be judicial murder, that I am fond of
animals, that I am very handsome with a brilliant complexion, that I have
blue eyes, that I have green eyes, that I have auburn and also brown hair, that
I am tall and also not above the average height, that I am well and decently
dressed, that I robbed a dead woman to appear so, that I am brisk and smart
about my work, that I am of a sullen disposition with a quarrelsome temper,
that I have the appearance of a person rather above my humble station, that
I am a good girl with a pliable nature and no harm is told of me, that I am
cunning and devious, that I am soft in the head and little better than an idiot.
And I wonder, how can I be all of these different things at once? (23)
This long list, quoted in full to represent the many versions of
events and varying personal attributes that Atwood incorporates here,
also provides a postmodern contemplation of the fluidity of identity as
process, not product. Moreover, it may also covertly say something
about how a lawyer constructs a case: using what is useful (not neces-
sarily what is relevant or even in some cases truthful) and discarding
anything that does not fit the “story.” Grace claims, after all, that it
was her lawyer’s decision for her to appear stupid; it “fit” his case.
Grace, reflected in many mirrors here, somehow continues to elude
description; the many versions proffered of her give the reader less to
go on, not more.
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Hutchings argues that the working-class female criminal was con-
sidered “feeble-minded,” the middle-class woman “mad”;30 despite
her clearly determinable class status, however, Grace takes up both
positions. She is feeble-minded at her trial, a factor that may have
spared her life when her accomplice—or dupe, or abusive captor—
was hanged; she is mad at points in the narrative, too, shipped to the
nearby asylum for periods of time. It is the “mad” Grace Marks that
Susanna Moodie writes about in Life in the Clearings (a source that
Atwood was later to discredit as sensationalist and inaccurate).
Instead of providing us with “her” story, the fictional Grace
records her refusal to be subject to the usual “female story,” a story
that has entrapped all the women that she came to know. In this
“female story,” the results of romantic love are disgrace, betrayal, and
abandonment; this message is reinforced not only in her own family
circumstances, but by her fellow servant and friend, Mary Whitney,
whose liaison with the master’s son leads to betrayal, botched abor-
tion, and subsequent death. They are all, as Grace notes, “the same
story” (165).
Story itself comes to define the novel, as Grace’s position alters
depending on who is gazing upon her. For example, Dr. Simon Jor-
dan, the man who is given the task of psychoanalyzing her for the
purpose of recovering her memory, notes of her fate: “But what does
an example do, afterwards? thought Simon. Her story is over. The
main story, that is; the thing that has defined her. How is she sup-
posed to fill in the rest of the time?” (91). Moreover, the narrator
comments after one of their sessions together, “They’ve been talking
together all afternoon as if in a parlour; and now he is free as air and
may do whatever he likes, while she must be bolted and barred.
Caged in a dreary prison. Deliberately dreary, for if a prison were not
dreary, where would be the punishment?” (186).
The punishment enacted upon the women in Nights at the Cir-
cus—to be permanently visible—is circumvented in many respects
by Grace. She records that the height of windows in her prison pre-
vents any sight—either in or out: “They do not want you looking out,
they do not want you thinking the word out, they do not want you
looking at the horizon and thinking you might one day drop below it
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yourself, like the sail of a ship departing or a horse and rider vanish-
ing down a far hillside” (237; italics in original). It is when Grace is
outside the prison walls, working for the governor’s wife and thus sub-
ject to the female gaze, that she undermines the notion of being
watched:
There is a good deal that can be seen slantwise, especially by the ladies, who
do not wish to be caught staring. They can also see through veils, and win-
dow curtains, and over the tops of fans; and it is a good thing they can see in
this way, or they would never see much of anything. But those of us who do
not have to be bothered with all the veils and fans manage to see a good deal
more. (229)
Here, Grace wrests control from her superiors by gazing herself,
and by controlling the way in which she is gazed upon. Grace thus
incorporates a jumble of contradictory roles: she is the “perfect” lady,
serving food for the prison governor’s wife, sewing intricate patterns,
maintaining chastity, and generally conforming to expected feminine
behavior; she is also a violent prisoner who may or may not have
invited sexual congress with a variety of men. The “truth” depends on
whichever story is being told. As Judith Knelman notes, Atwood “con-
structs Grace through a chain of texts—contextualizes their mean-
ing—so that they represent more than the historical events that they
were constructed to mark.”31 These representations are decidedly plu-
ral, as Atwood keeps a variety of possible storylines afloat: Grace is
possessed; Grace is mad; Grace is psychically disturbed; Grace is
cunning; Grace is guilty. Each reading is given support in the novel;
no reading is fully discounted as false. Each reading acts as a legal
text, either conforming to or contradicting a lawyer’s construction of
innocence or guilt. Perhaps underneath this knowledge is the famil-
iar claim that law equates with storytelling. Jane B. Baron suggests
that
the claim “law is just a story” is perfectly ambiguous.l.l.l.lIt could mean that
law fails to take account of important experiences and facts and has therefore
gotten things wrong. Or the claim that law is just a story could mean that in
law, as elsewhere in life, there is no unmediated way to know the truth, i.e.,
to get things right, so that law can never do more than reflect some particu-
lar points of view and, necessarily, suppress others.32
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Here, the idea of the law as a story works both ways; indeed,
Cristie March calls Alias Grace “an authorial mosaic” because it con-
tains so many voices and elements.33 It does not, however, contain a
definable truth.
Verbal communications are both excessive in the text—Grace’s
interlocutor silently accuses her of fabricating her many memories—
and secreted.34 Meaning is not readily supplied, but frequently needs
to be inferred, as with the hints of lesbian desire that the text both
uncovers and covers over. Grace loves her servant friend Mary so
much that she appears to become her in a spooky, séance-invoked
explanation of the murders, and she perhaps covets more than Nancy
Montgomery’s clothes, though supposed jealousy motives are (at least
overtly) framed within assumed heterosexuality. The lesbian as ghost-
ly spectacle (the unspeakable) and the female criminal as aberrant
are clearly being connected here, and both “need” regulation.
Indeed, as Peter Hutchings argues, “the nineteenth century subject is
haunted by crime, by its signs and stories and the shapes of institu-
tions designed for its regulation.”35 Thus it is very much in keeping
with the notion of the aberrant female and the panopticon prison that
Grace Marks may fabricate a story of ghostly possession; it is also in
keeping with this story that she appears to offer an explanation that
allows her to keep her innocence while permitting behavior and
speech that are in themselves “unacceptable.” If she is not responsi-
ble for the crimes committed during the time that the spirit of Mary
takes possession of her body, then she cannot be held responsible for
the vulgar voice that describes such actions. Given the novel’s focus
on psychoanalysis, it is also possible that this story is one of multiple
personalities, or associative personality disorder, a diagnosis still
under much debate in medical communities today. Either explanato-
ry framework leaves Grace “innocent,” a victim of spiritual or mental
displacement, even if her actions may label her “guilty.”
Simon Jordan’s reaction to the séance that invokes a contested
confession is one of confusion, not least because the event is meant
to be a scientific exploration of hypnosis, not the spectacle it be-
comes: “He was expecting a series of monosyllables, mere yes’s and
no’s dragged out of her, out of lethargy and stupor; a series of com-
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pleted and somnolent responses to his own firm demands.l.l.l.lThis
voice cannot be Grace’s; yet in that case, whose voice is it?” (400). In
the trial, Grace’s voice is co-opted by her lawyer to tell a story of
imbecility; under hypnosis, her voice conforms neither to the histori-
cal monosyllabic Marks nor to the story of her innocence: this “oth-
er” voice may represent a slanted truth that no one present seems
able to credit. Indeed, when asked to record his findings, Simon Jor-
dan realizes that “[t]he safest thing would be to write nothing at
all.l.l.l.l[T]he fact is that he can’t state anything with certainty and
still tell the truth, because the truth eludes him. Or rather it’s Grace
herself who eludes him. She glides ahead of him, just out of his
grasp, turning her head to see if he’s still following” (407).
This final rendering of Grace is not accidental in its ghostly
metaphor. Hutchings argues that “[t]he criminal is, thus, not some
shadowy counterpart of the law-abiding citizen but as spectre the very
form of law and the shape it seeks to control, a spectre jointly pro-
duced through the discourses of law, literature, psychiatry, aesthetics
and criminology.”36 As specter, Grace is the object of discourse as well
as the object of the gaze: Dr. Jordan wants to capture the truth of her,
to get her to speak; the governor’s wife wants her to be a containable
spectacle; and others want to know once and for all whether she is
innocent or guilty, states of being that the courts suggest are mutually
incompatible. However, Grace Marks has successfully eluded all
such containers. She may be visible in her panopticon, and she may
carry the penitentiary wherever she walks outside its walls, according
to the Penitentiary Act, but in her refusal to speak except as Other
than herself, and in her refusal to be penitent (just as the prisoners of
Nights at the Circus refused to be so), she unravels the power of
panoptical structures, both real and metaphorical.
Luce Irigaray offers a reading of woman that fits with the multiple,
elusive readings of Grace Marks, and the failures to contain her:
Thus the “object” is not as massive, as resistant, as one might wish to believe.
And her possession by a “subject,” a subject’s desire to appropriate her, is yet
another of his vertiginous failures. For where he projects a something to
absorb, to take, to see, to possessl.l.l.las well as a path of ground to stand upon,
a mirror to catch his reflection, he is already faced by another specularization.
Whose twisted character is her inability to say what she represents.37
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Innocence or guilt is ultimately unassignable to Grace Marks;
they are lost in history and remain unclear even then, despite a guilty
verdict. In the historical records, Grace provides monosyllabic an-
swers to the Liberty Questions and departs for New York. In Atwood’s
version, Grace coincidentally ends up marrying a childhood friend,
the boy who ironically helped convict her, and he seeks her penance
in oddly sexual ways. Thus Atwood provides a nineteenth-century
closure to her text—the fallen woman raised and married—but she
hints at further degradation to come. Sarah Waters’s Affinity, by con-
trast, chooses the “other” nineteenth-century closure for a wayward
heroine: death.
Affinity: The Panopticon as Queer Geometry
Affinity (1999) is a lesbian gothic novel about a nineteenth-centu-
ry prison “Lady Visitor” named Margaret Prior and her relationship
with the seemingly wrongly accused spiritualist, Selina Dawes, whom
she helps escape from prison. Taking its place within the framework
of lesbian gothic, Affinity offers an unreliable yet somehow sympa-
thetic narrator; a series of fantastical, spooky events; and a desire that
cannot be readily acknowledged. The novel describes a model pan-
opticon, Millbank Prison, which was originally designed by Jeremy
Bentham and is now palimpsestically the site of Tate Britain. Its
“queer geometry,”38 recorded but only faultily understood by the nar-
rator, is clear to the twenty-first century reader familiar both with
Bentham’s panopticon and Foucault’s reading of it. Here, again, the
gaze is feminized, as matron watches the women inmates, as Mar-
garet’s mother’s gaze extends into the prison through Margaret’s own
awareness of propriety, and as Margaret first watches the prisoners
and then transgresses into the space of the prisoners themselves.
In this context, “queerness” takes on a more significant meaning,
and double discourses become the norm. Indeed, language is as
important as vision in the novel. The repeated references to the
“queerness” of Selina’s crimes, and of Millbank, and of Margaret’s
passion for it, indicate a self-conscious reference to the lesbian desires
of the text. A second deliberately repeated word is “unnatural”;
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though not repeated as frequently as “queer,” its connotations also
remind one of nineteenth-century medical associations of lesbianism
with illness or monstrosity.
Paraphrasing Freud, Paulina Palmer argues that “the power that
Gothic fantasy reveals to disturb and frighten the reader stems from
its ability to articulate emotions and anxieties related to ‘the return of
the repressed.’” 39 What is repressed, for Margaret, is any sense of les-
bian desire. Indeed, near the beginning of the text she appears to be
positively homophobic when she congratulates herself on having cir-
cumvented communication between two prisoners: “I followed,
though uneasily—for I have heard them talk of ‘pals’ before, and
have used the word myself, but it disturbed me to find that the term
had that particular meaning and I hadn’t known it. Nor, somehow,
do I care to think that I had almost played the medium, innocently,
for Jarvis’ dark passion” (67). This early passage highlights the ways in
which Waters cleverly blends all of the aspects of her tightly woven
text: Margaret is a typical naïve heroine, willingly expressing received
societal values, while simultaneously concealing—even from the
reader at this point—her own desires. Moreover, the use of the word
“medium” is deliberate, clearly conjuring the image of a spiritualist.
When Margaret first enters the prison, her skirts get “caught upon
some jutting iron or brick” (8). This telling detail, which marks
clothes as significant in the narrative of women’s (imprisoned) lives,
is the first of many references to appearance, and it is linked to the
female gaze: “it is in lifting my eyes from my sweeping hem that I
first see the pentagons of Millbankl.l.l.land the suddenness of that
gaze, makes them seem terrible” (8). Despite this sight, Margaret Pri-
or, a laudanum addict and bereaved spinster who is mourning the
death of her scholar-father, becomes a Lady Visitor for Millbank
Prison with the hope that her behavior will serve as a model for the
prisoners. Like the Countess P., however, Margaret nurses crimes of
her own: addiction, a suicide attempt, and a “dark passion” for anoth-
er woman, her (now) sister-in-law, Helen. Given that the Gothic
Romance formula focuses on issues of sexual or social transgression40
and depends upon a sense of enclosure, where better to set a gothic
text than in a model prison, with the protagonist a mere visitor?
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A second narrative entwines with Margaret’s while also preceding
it chronologically by a year. Selina Dawes, a spiritualist, recounts her
life prior to imprisonment. Her diary entries are cruder and less
accomplished than Margaret’s, but the reader is given no reason to
disbelieve them. Indeed, so well does Waters limn Selina’s character
that, on a first reading, we are subject to the uncanniness of this
spooky, sexy novel.
Palmer reminds us that “[h]aunting and spectral visitations, whether
associated with an individual or a place, are among the most common
signifiers of the uncanny in Gothic fiction.”41 Waters’s novel relies on
uncanniness to seduce the reader, making the prison’s “queer geome-
try” central to this mood. Foucault’s underlying reading of the panopti-
con is also clear. Selina bitterly acknowledges that “ ‘[a]ll the world
may look at me, it is part of my punishment’” (47). Thus, again we
have a reminder of the major effect of the panopticon, which is “to
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that
assures the automatic functioning of power.”42 Moreover, “the perfec-
tion of power should tend to render its actual exercise unneces-
sary.l.l.l.l[T]he inmates should be caught up in a power situation of
which they are themselves the bearers.”43 In Affinity, Margaret acts as a
bearer of power in two ways: as observer of the inmates, and as her own
observer, aware of her position as a lady. Margaret is thus complicit in
her own subjugation and is always aware of propriety (even when,
under the influence of her medication, she transgresses that space).
Indeed, despite the fact that Selina is the prisoner and Margaret a
mere visitor, Margaret is the one who becomes locked within the
panoptical moment. She thinks of one of the wardens, “You are as
snared by Millbank as they are” (244; italics in original), without rec-
ognizing that these words also encode her own ensnarement. While
Selina, as prisoner, appears subject to the machinery of the panopti-
con, she, in fact, manages to circumvent it, creating illusions of
ghostly contacts that heighten the sense of gothic power.
Palmer argues that “[w]hereas Gothic narrative explores the disin-
tegration of the self into double or multiple facets, queer theory fore-
grounds the multiple sexualities and roles that the subject produces
and enacts.”44 Selina is a mistress of disguise, assuming the stance of
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the wronged innocent in order to entice Margaret into helping to free
her. So desperate is Margaret for love that she refuses to acknowledge
any artifice: “[Selina] has a way about her—I have noticed it, before
to-day—a way of shifting mood, of changing tone, and pose. She does
it very subtly—not as an actress might, with a gesture that must be
seen across a dark and crowded theatre” (86). Margaret rejects the
link between Selina and an actress, as well she might, for to acknowl-
edge Selina’s acting ability would be to acknowledge that she herself
is taken in.
Moreover, historically, of course, there has been a perceived link
between actresses and prostitution, and Margaret must also negate
any sense that there is a sexual transaction taking place between
them—even when she persuades Selina to strip for her in a scene
that, upon rereading, becomes a clear exercise of power. The first
reading of this scene is one of consensual pleasure: on her last visit to
Millbank before the planned escape, Margaret visits Selina at bed-
time, and it seems natural for Margaret to wish to watch Selina
undress. Margaret exclaims, “ ‘How beautiful you are!’” (310) and Seli-
na’s surprise and denial are responses any lover might make.
[Selina] let her dress fall from her, and removed the under-skirt and the
prison boots and then, after another hesitation, the bonnet, until she stood,
shivering slightly, in her woollen stockings and her petticoat. She held her-
self stiffly, and kept her face turned from me—as if it hurt to have me gaze
at her, yet she would suffer the pain of it, for my sake. (309)
Selina’s shivering and reticence appear to be the results of a cold
prison and a modest nature. Once the reader knows the truth of Seli-
na’s relationship to Margaret—rather than being in love with her, she
is, in fact, duping her—the passage takes on a different meaning. Seli-
na is an actress, the prison is her theater, and Margaret as audience is
duly taken in. She reads the scene as she wants to read it, not as it
actually appears. She gazes upon a mere illusion, one designed to
suggest that it is Margaret who is powerful, rather than the other way
around. In this, Margaret again resembles the Countess P., whose
desires for repentance become her own imprisonment.
Critics have noted the way in which lesbian desire has been
decorporealized and made spectral,45 as if the actual bodily connec-
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tions that lesbianism connotes cannot be accommodated. In a lesbian
gothic text, a ghost may act as a way of “negating physical intimacy
between women.”46 Indeed, I would argue that Waters, aware of the
many and varied ways in which lesbianism has remained hidden,
deliberately replicates this concealment with Margaret’s half-acknowl-
edged desire and her references to hauntings. As the narrator suggests,
“Perhaps, however, it is the same with spinsters as with ghosts; and one
has to be of their ranks in order to see them at all” (58). For spinster,
read, in this instance, lesbian, and one can see what tricks Waters is
herself playing here.
Waters also plays with Selina’s lesbian impulses, multiply cover-
ing over the real object of desire; Selina’s “love” for Margaret is a dis-
placed, manufactured love that hides her passion for a woman named
Ruth Vigers. At the same time, Ruth Vigers is herself doubly hidden.
She is Ruth to Selina, and first introduced to us as a maid; she is
Vigers to Margaret, and also positioned as a maid, but there is no ini-
tial reason to connect the “two” women—Ruth and Vigers—in the
text. It is only at the end that it becomes clear that Vigers acts as a
conduit—or medium—of Selina’s seemingly supernatural messages
to Margaret. Finally, Ruth acts as an accomplice in Selina’s séances,
dressing up as the supposedly heterosexual ghostly “control,” Peter
Quick. Trickery and artifice signify such occurrences; thus it is dou-
bly appropriate that Peter Quick, who jealously guards Selina’s repu-
tation and virtue, should himself be conjured as a lustful, heterosexu-
al male who takes liberties with the young women at the séances.
The word “control” is significant, for clearly Ruth does control Seli-
na. Indeed, Ruth Vigers’s essential voicelessness (throughout, the
reader sees her primarily as a background figure and a servant) is
undercut by allowing her the last line of the novel, claiming Selina
for her own: “ ‘Rememberl.l.l.lwhose girl you are’” (352).
At the end of the novel, Margaret is betrayed, Selina and Ruth dis-
appear like the ghosts they have been connected to, and Margaret
chooses death above a return to her stifling, spinster life. The panop-
ticon is breached: the physical prisoner has slipped away, and the
gaze has shifted. As Margaret herself realizes, “But, then, that passion
was always theirs. Every time I stood in Selina’s cell, feeling my flesh
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yearn towards hers, there might as well have been Vigers at the gate,
looking on, stealing Selina’s gaze from me to her” (341–42). Margaret,
denied Selina’s loving gaze, is finally trapped within the gaze of pro-
priety. Despite her class status—or perhaps because of it—she is the
victim of a metaphorical panopticon, watched for failure: by her fam-
ily, by the prison wardens, and by herself. In the end, then, it is not
surprising that she chooses to hide away—chooses, in some ways, to
inhabit a dungeon, which Foucault argues is the reverse of a panopti-
con, its functions “to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide.”47 The
novel ends with Margaret ensconced in her home, hiding from the
law in the form of a neighborhood policeman, and planning her own
death. Waters’s use of the panopticon as a real structure and a
metaphorical enclosure is thus cleverly upturned, with the position
of the prisoner finally assigned to the one who, had she not been a
lady, would herself have been at Millbank, too. Margaret Prior’s ini-
tial crime is attempted suicide; by the end of the novel, she has suc-
ceeded, and learned the lesson an inmate taught her: “ ‘You think of
your crimes—you don’t think, “If I had not done that, I wouldn’t be
here,” you think, “If I had only done that better . . .” ’” (108; italics and
ellipses in original).
Marie Fox notes that “narratives in both law and literature utilise
punishment to effect a closure,”48 yet these women’s stories exist
beyond the ending, or rather, provide a series of alternative endings
that do not come together into a coherent whole: Carter’s murderess-
es disappear, Grace Marks slides from history, and Selina Dawes is
spirited away. The three texts that I have analyzed in this chapter,
Nights at the Circus, Alias Grace, and Affinity, are linked through
their incorporation of the panoptic gaze, as well as the recognition of
its ultimate failure to contain these female criminals. If the panopti-
con is more overtly referenced in the first and last texts, it is also in
operation in Atwood’s novel, with the recognition that Kingston Peni-
tentiary was, like the fictional Countess P.’s prison and Millbank
Prison, based on Bentham’s plans. Moreover, each of these texts fore-
grounds the gaze as a powerful medium of control, referring back to
Foucault’s reading of the panopticon. What each of these texts also
does, however, is ensure that the prisoners exert control through the
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gaze, by reflecting back or reflecting on those who think that they
hold the power. The panoptical power of the prisons is thus reversed,
with the prison-keepers subject to incarceration or control. The
Countess P., Dr. Simon Jordan, and Margaret and the Millbank
Prison wardens are thus connected through the ways in which their
inspection of the prisoners results in a misrecognition of their own
positions.
In this way, Carter, Atwood, and Waters engage with debates
about power, illusion, and subversive control. Moreover, they explore
the ways in which gender itself is implicated in these texts, as the
female body comes under surveillance both by men and by women.
More often than not, the gaze is feminized—though not necessarily
with any kind of overarching “sisterhood” being trumpeted as the end
result. Indeed, only in Carter’s novel is the covert lesbian desire of the
text eventually acknowledged freely. For the others, such “dark pas-
sion” takes its place as the historically hidden but more than poten-
tially subversive element that disrupts Foucault’s sense of the panopti-
con. Visibility may be a trap, with Foucault’s prisoner remaining “the
object of information, never the subject in communication,”49 but
Carter, Atwood, and Waters suggest that such a reading is only partial,
as their prisoners communicate beyond—and outside—the walls that
enclose them, registering desire, betrayal, and refusal to conform. As
Bartky argues, “Foucault seems sometimes on the verge of depriving
us of a vocabulary in which to conceptualize the nature and meaning
of those periodic refusals of control that, just as much as the imposi-
tion of control, mark the course of human history.”50 If Foucault is
silent on these matters, feminist writers are not, and in their explo-
rations of women and the law, they indeed write beyond the ending
of women’s imprisonment, and see beyond the panoptical gaze that
initially appears inescapable.
In the next chapter, the gaze turns from the prison narratives of
white women caught up in nineteenth-century mores to the narra-
tives of American slaves. Maintaining a focus on the literary pull of
earlier centuries, chapter 2 focuses on the continuing fascination that
the period of legal slavery in the United States has for female authors
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